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Pareto Eﬃcient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilities∗
Abstract
This paper studies Pareto eﬃc i e n ti n c o m et a x a t i o ni na ne c o n o m yw i t hﬁnitely-lived individuals whose
income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov process. The study yields three main
results. First, when individuals are risk neutral, the fraction of individuals who face a positive marginal
income tax rate is always positive but decreases over time, converging to zero if the time horizon is long
enough. Moreover, the tax rate these individuals face also goes to zero. Second, the earnings distortions
are continuous with respect to the degree of risk aversion at the risk neutral solution. Third, Pareto eﬃcient
income tax systems can be time-consistent even when the degree of correlation in ability types is large.
The condition for time consistency suggests a novel theoretical reason why the classic equity-eﬃciency
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A central problem in normative public economics is the design of income tax systems. The
fundamental diﬃculty is that, while individuals’ incomes may be observable, their abilities to earn
income are unobservable (Mirrlees (1971)). Thus, if equity considerations demand that higher
ability individuals should pay a larger share of government spending, those with higher incomes
must pay more taxes. But this raises the possibility that higher ability individuals may avoid their
obligations by reducing their earnings to masquerade as low ability individuals. To mitigate this
possibility, income tax systems must optimally screen ability types which requires distorting the
earnings of individuals downwards. These distortions imply a basic trade-oﬀ between equity and
aggregate eﬃciency.
Much of the literature on the design of income taxation has taken a static perspective. While its
lessons may apply in a dynamic context when individuals’ income generating abilities are constant,
the more relevant case is that in which abilities, while persistent, may vary over time. This case
raises three new theoretical questions. When abilities have some persistence, the eﬃcient screening
of ability types may require that the tax system be non-stationary, making current taxes depend
upon individuals’ past earnings choices. The ﬁrst question, therefore, is what is the pattern of
distortions in individuals’ earnings choices and how do these vary over time? Moreover, when
abilities are variable, the tax system will impact the allocation of consumption across states
and time. There will be a trade-oﬀ between the goals of smoothing consumption and providing
incentives. The second question, therefore, is what are the pattern of distortions in the allocation
of consumption across states and time? Finally, when abilities are variable, it is not clear if
eﬃcient tax systems are time consistent. In the constant ability case, optimal income tax systems
are never time-consistent. Distortionary taxation is necessary to screen ability types, but after
individuals have revealed their abilities, the government will ﬁnd it optimal to eliminate such
distortions, making the original tax system non credible (Roberts (1984)). However, when abilities
are stochastic, residual uncertainty remains, because an individual may change type. Accordingly,
the government must still screen types in the remaining periods. The third question, therefore, is
under what circumstances are eﬃcient tax systems time consistent?
This paper sheds light on the ﬁrst and third of these questions. It analyzes a dynamic version of
the classic Mirrlees model in which, in any period, there are two ability types - low and high - and
1individuals’ abilities follow a Markov process. Following the approach of Stiglitz (1982, 1985a),
the paper studies the Pareto eﬃciency problem of maximizing the expected utility of those who
start out as high ability subject to a given target utility for those who are initially low ability.1 It
then studies whether these eﬃcient allocations are time consistent in the sense that they cannot
be Pareto dominated as information about individuals’ ability types is revealed over time.
The paper begins by assuming that individuals’ per period utility is a quasi-linear function
of consumption and labor, implying that they are risk neutral.2 This makes the consumption
smoothing issue moot and permits a clean focus on the ﬁrst and third questions. The analysis of
this case yields clear and striking results. With regard to the dynamics of earnings distortions,
the only individuals whose earnings are distorted are those who currently are and have always
been low ability. All other individuals face a zero marginal rate of taxation. Moreover, the degree
to which these perpetual low types have their earnings distorted decreases over time, converging
to zero if the time horizon is long enough. Thus, not only is the fraction of individuals who face a
positive marginal tax rate converging to zero, but the tax rate these individuals are facing goes to
zero. Thus, in a very strong sense, the distortions caused by eﬃcient income tax schemes vanish
over time.
With regard to time consistency, we establish a lower bound on the correlation in types such
that below it the optimal tax system is time consistent. We also ﬁnd that when the correlation
of types is above this bound, it is governments with higher spending commitments and/or more
ambitious redistributive objectives who ﬁnd it harder to commit to implement eﬃcient income
tax systems. Accordingly, it is governments with more progressive agendas that will be forced to
pursue their objectives with third best policies. Since these will lead to greater distortions and
larger reductions in aggregate eﬃciency than second best policies, the result suggests that the
equity-eﬃciency trade oﬀ will be steeper than suggested by static optimal tax theory.
To assess the robustness of our results on earnings distortions, we also study the case of
risk averse individuals. In a two period version of the model with risk aversion, we show that
individuals who are low ability in the second period face a positive marginal tax rate even if they
were previously high ability. Thus, risk neutrality is a necessary condition for our result on earnings
1 This is distinct from the approach of Mirrlees (1971) who characterizes the problem of maximizing an additive
social welfare function.
2 The quasi-linear speciﬁcation has also proved useful in the study of static optimal income taxation. See, for
example, Diamond (1998), Besley and Coate (1995) and Salanie (2003).
2distortions described above. However, we also provide a general continuity result (for any number
of periods) showing that the distortion in the earnings of individuals who are either currently high
types or who have been previously low types is small for small degrees of risk aversion. Thus, the
basic insight that earnings distortions vanish over time is robust to introducing small amounts of
risk aversion.
The paper contributes to a small but growing literature that approaches the problem of dy-
namic optimal taxation using the mechanism design approach of static optimal tax theory, the
so-called New Dynamic Public Finance.3 This literature was recently reviewed by Kocherlakota
(2006).4 Our paper diﬀers from this recent literature in both focus and style. In terms of focus,
the literature has been primarily concerned with the Utilitarian problem of maximizing aggre-
gate expected utility rather than on characterizing Pareto eﬃcient tax systems. Relatedly, it is
the problem of consumption smoothing (the second question above) rather than the dynamics of
earnings distortions or the problem of time inconsistency (the ﬁrst and third questions) that has
attracted the most attention. Most papers have assumed that ability types are serially uncor-
r e l a t e dw h i c hm a k e sb o t ht h eﬁrst and third questions less interesting, while those papers that
have considered more general stochastic processes (Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinsky (2003),
Kocherlakota (2005)), have focused their analysis on a study of the implications of the ﬁrst order
conditions for intertemporal consumption. In terms of style, our model is much simpler than those
in the recent literature. While it does incorporate persistence in abilities, it has only two ability
types, no capital, exogenous interest rates, and, for much of the analysis, risk neutral individuals.
The advantage of these more restrictive assumptions is that they allow us both to provide a com-
plete characterization of second best eﬃcient allocations. Indeed, as far as we are aware, ours is
the ﬁrst paper to provide a full characterization of second best eﬃcient allocations in a dynamic
stochastic version of the Mirrlees model.
In characterizing second best eﬃcient allocations and studying their time consistency, our pa-
per draws on the dynamic contracting literature. In particular, we follow the analytical approach
employed by Battaglini (2005a) to study a monopoly pricing problem with long-lived consumers
3 This “new” approach is distinct from the “traditional” approach that makes the assumption that the govern-
ment is constrained to use linear taxes (see Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a review).
4 Earlier papers in this style include Brito et al (1991), Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), Ordover and Phelps
(1979), Roberts (1984) and Stiglitz (1985b). See also Berliant and Ledyard (2003) who characterize time consistent
taxation in a two period model with constant ability types.
3whose tastes evolve according to a Markov process. We show that his approach can be fruitfully
applied to the problem of optimal income taxation. The taxation problem is somewhat more
involved than the pricing problem, in part because it involves characterizing the entire Pareto
frontier rather than simply ﬁnding the proﬁt maximizing solution. Among other things, char-
acterizing the entire frontier helps us understand the role of the government’s initial spending
commitments and redistributive objectives in determining the time consistency of eﬃcient allo-
cations. Our analysis also extends Battaglini’s work by investigating the robustness of optimal
policies to risk aversion.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the
model. Section 3 explores the properties of second best eﬃcient allocations under risk neutrality
and draws out the implications for the eﬃcient taxation of labor income. Section 4 studies how
risk aversion modiﬁes the conclusions. Section 5 analyses the time consistency of second best
eﬃcient allocations under risk neutrality and Section 6 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We study an economy with a continuum of individuals that lasts for T periods. There are two
goods - consumption and leisure. In each period t, individuals get utility from consumption xt






where ϕ is increasing, strictly convex, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable. The parameter σ
measures individuals’ risk aversion. A special case of interest is when σ = 0 and individuals are
risk neutral. Individuals are endowed with l units of time in each period. To avoid having to
worry about corner solutions, we assume that ϕ0(0) = 0 and that liml→l ϕ0(l)=∞. Individuals
discount the future at rate δ<1.
Individuals diﬀer in their income generating abilities. In period t, an individual with income
generating ability θt earns income yt = θtlt if he works an amount lt. There are two ability levels,
low and high, denoted by {θL,θ H} where 0 <θ L <θ H. A fraction µ ∈ (0,1) of individuals start
out with high ability in period one. However, those who start out as high ability may become low
ability and visa versa. Speciﬁcally, each individual’s ability follows a Markov process with support








Ability types are correlated but not perfectly, so that αLL >α HL > 0a n dαHH >α LH > 0.
The economy also has a government. In each period, this government spends an amount G.
While this spending does not directly impact individuals’ utilities, the government must raise the
revenue necessary to ﬁnance it. The government can borrow or lend at the exogenously ﬁxed
interest rate which equals 1
δ − 1.
A history for an individual at time t consists of a list of his previous t − 1 abilities; i.e.,
ht = {θ1,...,θ t−1}.L e th1 = ∅ denote the history at time 1 and let Ht denote the set of all histories
at time t. Let the notation ht+j º ht mean that ht+j follows ht (i.e., its ﬁrst t−1c o m p o n e n t sa r e
equal to ht). An allocation in this economy is described by (x,y)={(xt(ht,θ t),y t(ht,θ t))}T
t=1.
Here (xt(ht,θ t),y t(ht,θ t)) is the consumption-earnings bundle of those individuals who have ability








This says that the present value of consumption and government spending equals the present value
of earnings. Under the allocation (x,y), the expected utility at time t of an individual with ability











In addition to raising the revenue necessary to ﬁnance its spending, the government has the
distributional objective of providing those citizens who start out with low ability a lifetime ex-
pected utility of at least u. The government would like to achieve its distributional and revenue
raising goals eﬃciently and hence would like to implement an allocation that solves the following
5 Obviously, feasibility also demands that individuals’ consumptions in each period be non-negative. However,
we will ignore these constraints in what follows, eﬀectively focusing on the properties of interior allocations.
5problem
max(x,y) V1((x,y),h 1,θ H;σ)
s.t. V1((x,y),h 1,θ L;σ) ≥ u (UL)
PT
t=1 δt−1E[xt(ht,θ t)+G] ≤
PT
t=1 δt−1E[yt(ht,θ t)]. (R)
In the sequel we refer to this problem as the Eﬃciency Problem and to allocations that solve it
as eﬃcient allocations.
When individuals are risk averse (σ>0), an allocation (x,y)s o l v e st h eE ﬃciency Problem if
and only if three conditions are satisﬁed. First, individuals’ consumption levels are constant across
time and states. Second, individuals work up until the point at which their marginal disutility of
work equals the marginal utility of the consumption that work produces. Third, the UL and R
constraints are satisﬁed with equality. The ﬁrst condition requires that those who start out with
high ability in period one have constant consumption xH, while those who are low types get xL.
The second condition requires that those who are high types in period one earn an amount yH
H
in a period in which they have high ability and an amount yL







H/θL). Similarly, those who are low types in period one
earn an amount yH
L in a period in which they have high ability and an amount yL
L when they have
low ability where θHx
−σ
L = ϕ0(yH




In the case of risk neutrality, individuals are indiﬀerent as to the allocation of consumption
across time and states. Thus, for eﬃciency, all that is important is that individuals’ work decisions
are optimal. An allocation therefore solves the Eﬃciency Problem if and only if individuals work
up until the point at which their marginal disutility of work equals their marginal product and
the UL and R constraints are satisﬁed with equality.
If the government can observe individuals’ income generating abilities, it can implement an
eﬃcient allocation with a simple system of lump sum taxes.6 However, we assume that the
6 Let y∗(T,θ) denote the earnings level that would maximize the static utility of an individual with ability
θ ∈ {θL,θ H} if he had to pay a lump sum tax T;t h a ti s ,y∗(T,θ)m a x i m i z e s
(y−T)1−σ
1−σ − ϕ(y/θ) subject to the
constraint that y/θ ∈ [0,l]. Then, any eﬃcient allocation (x,y) can be implemented as follows. Individuals who
are start out with high ability in period one pay a lump sum tax TH where y∗(TH,θ H)−TH = xH.T h e ya l s op a y
this tax in any future period in which they have high ability. In any period in which they have low ability, their tax
burdens are reduced in such a way as to maintain their consumption at the same level. Thus, they pay a tax THL
such that y∗(THL,θ L) − THL = xH.I ne ﬀect, the tax system completely insures them against any consumption
loss resulting from a shock in their income generating ability. The story for those who are start out with low ability
in period one is similar. In the ﬁrst period, they pay the lump sum tax TL where y∗(TL,θ L)−TL = xL.T h e ya l s o
p a yt h i st a xi na n yf u t u r ep e r i o di nw h i c ht h e ya r el o wt y p e s .I na n yp e r i o di nw h i c ht h e ye x p e r i e n c eh i g ha b i l i t y ,
6government is not able to observe individuals’ income generating abilities. This unobservability
constrains the allocations that the government might reasonably achieve. Speciﬁcally, allocations
must now satisfy the following set of incentive constraints: for all time periods t and histories ht,






)+δE[Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ t+1;σ)|θt = θH ]( ICH(ht))
and






)+δE[Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ H),θ t+1;σ)|θt = θL]. (ICL(ht))
These constraints ensure that in any period t after any history ht individuals are always better oﬀ
with the bundle intended for them than the bundle intended for any other individual they could
credibly claim to be.7
Given its informational constraints, the best the government can do is to achieve an allocation
that solves the following incentive constrained problem
max(x,y) V1((x,y),h 1,θ H;σ)
s.t. UL,R ,a n dI C H(ht)&ICL(ht) for all t & ht.
W er e f e rt ot h i sa st h eSecond Best Eﬃciency Problem and to allocations that solve this as second
best eﬃcient allocations. Our interest lies in understanding what solutions to this problem look
like and how the government may achieve them via tax-transfer systems.
It is important to be clear on the nature of the incentive problems created by the government’s
inability to observe its citizens’ abilities. There are two distinct problems. The ﬁrst is created by
the government’s desire to redistribute from those citizens who start out with high ability to those
who are initially low ability. If the target level of utility for those who start out with low ability
(u)i ss u ﬃciently high, those who are initially high types will have an incentive to masquerade as
low types. This is the incentive problem stressed in the literature on Pareto eﬃcient taxation (see
Stiglitz (1982), (1985a)).
The second incentive problem arises even if all individuals are ex ante identical and is created
by the tension between the desire to provide insurance and the need to provide work incentives.
they would pay a tax TLH such that y∗(TLH,θ H) − TLH = xL. Individuals have no incentive to save under this
tax system, as it keeps their marginal utility of consumption constant across time and states.
7 While these incentive constraints consider only one time deviations, the one-stage-deviation principle implies
that they ensure that individuals cannot gain from more complex mis-reporting strategies.
7When individuals are risk averse, eﬃciency requires that individuals have constant consumption
across time and states. This means that they are fully insured from future ability shocks. But
eﬃciency also requires that individuals who have higher productivity should provide more labor.
These two goals are mutually inconsistent. This incentive problem is the major focus of the New
Dynamic Public Finance literature.
Notice that the second incentive problem is not operative when individuals are risk neutral
because then providing insurance is not necessary for eﬃciency. By contrast, the ﬁrst incentive
problem arises even when individuals are risk neutral, provided that the target level of utility
for those who start out with low ability is high enough. To ensure that this target utility level
is suﬃciently high for the ﬁrst incentive problem to arise, we make the following assumption.
Consider the Utilitarian Problem of maximizing aggregate utility subject to the resource constraint
and the incentive constraints; that is,
max(x,y) µV1((x,y),h 1,θ H;σ)+( 1− µ)V1((x,y),h 1,θ L;σ)
s.t. R and ICH(ht)&ICL(ht) for all t & ht.
Then we assume that any solution to this problem violates the utility maintenance constraint UL;
that is, if (x,y) solves the Utilitarian Problem, then it must be the case that V1((x,y),h 1,θ L;σ) <
u.8
3 The case of risk neutrality
We begin our analysis of second best eﬃcient allocations by studying the case of risk neutrality;
that is, σ = 0. Note that, under this assumption, an allocation (x,y)i se ﬃcient if and only if the
earnings path y maximizes Marshallian aggregate surplus
T X
t=1




and the consumption path x is such that UL and R hold with equality. The surplus maximizing
earnings path has the property that in any period t after any history ht,y t(θH,h t)m u s te q u a l
y∗(θH)a n dyt(θL,h t)m u s te q u a ly∗(θL)w h e r ey∗(θ)s a t i s ﬁes the ﬁrst order condition θ = ϕ0(y/θ).
8 Thus, we are assuming that the government puts more weight on the utility of those who are initially low
types than on those who are initially high types. This would emerge from any social welfare function that is a
strictly concave function of citizen utilities.
83.1 Solution procedure
To characterize second best eﬃcient allocations, we study the following Relaxed Problem:
max(x,y) V1((x,y),h 1,θ H;σ)
s.t. UL,R ,a n dI C H(ht) for all t & ht.
The Relaxed Problem imposes the incentive constraints after any history only for those who are
currently high types. We will ﬁrst characterize the solution to the Relaxed Problem and then
explain the relationship between the Relaxed and Second Best Problems.
Our ﬁrst observation about the Relaxed Problem is:
Lemma 1 Suppose that σ =0and let (x,y) solve the Relaxed Problem. Then both UL and
ICH(h1) hold with equality.
The reason why the period one incentive constraint is binding is that, if it were not, then by
transferring resources forward in time as necessary, we could assure that none of the incentive
constraints were binding. But then the solution to the Relaxed Problem would involve the surplus
maximizing earnings path and a consumption path that satisﬁed all the incentive constraints
for the high type. From this allocation, by transferring consumption from the high type to the
low type in each period and after every history as needed, we can construct an allocation that
involves the surplus maximizing earnings levels and consumption levels such that all the incentive
constraints of the high type hold with equality. This allocation can be shown to satisfy all the low
types’ incentive constraints and hence solves the Utilitarian Problem. But this is a contradiction
since this allocation obviously satisﬁes the UL constraint strictly.
Lemma 1 does not imply that all the incentive constraints are binding because the solution
may involve giving those who are high types in the future suﬃcient consumption that they are
strictly better oﬀ not masquerading as low types. It turns out, however, that this possibility can
be ignored.
Lemma 2 Suppose that σ =0and let (x,y) be an allocation satisfying the constraints of the
Relaxed Problem. Then there exists x0 such that (x0,y) satisﬁes all the constraints and yields the
same value of the objective function as (x,y) but also satisﬁes ICH(ht) with equality for all periods
t>1 and all histories ht.
To understand this result, suppose that under the allocation (x,y) an incentive constraint is
not binding for individuals who are high types at some period t>1a f t e rs o m eh i s t o r yht =
9(ht−1,θ t−1). Then, we can make it bind by reducing the high types’ consumption in that period
and giving the expected present value to those with history ht−1 and ability θt−1 in period t − 1.
If θt−1 = θH then this has no implications for the incentive constraint of the high types in period
t − 1 with history ht−1. The gain in consumption in period t − 1i se x a c t l yo ﬀset by the loss in
expected consumption should they remain high types in period t.I fθt−1 = θL then the transfer
does have implications for the incentive constraint of the high types in period t − 1 with history
ht−1. On the one hand, masquerading as low types in period t−1 now yields more consumption in
period t−1. On the other, it yields less consumption in period t if individuals remain high types.
It turns out that because high types are more likely to remain high types than are low types to
become high types, the cost of lower future consumption outweighs the beneﬁt of higher current
consumption so that the incentive constraint still holds. Indeed, the transfer leads the incentive
constraint of the high type in period t − 1 with history ht−1 to be satisﬁed strictly. However, we
can repeat the process by reducing the consumption of the high type in period t −1w i t hh i s t o r y
ht−1 =( ht−2,θ t−2) and giving the expected present value to those with history ht−2 and ability
θt−2 in period t−2. By repeating this process as many times as necessary, we ﬁnd a consumption
path x0 that satisﬁes all the incentive constraints with equality except possibly the ﬁrst period
constraint.
It follows from Lemma 1 and 2 that there is no loss of generality in assuming that in the
solution to the relaxed problem ICH(ht) holds with equality for all t and ht. We can use this fact
to write the expected lifetime utility of an individual with high ability after history ht as
Vt ((x,y),h t,θ H;σ)=Vt ((x,y),h t,θ L;σ)+Φ(yt(ht,θ L)) + ∆EVt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ t+1;σ)
(1)
where Φ(y)=ϕ(y/θL) − ϕ(y/θH)a n d∆EVt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ t+1;σ)i st h ed i ﬀerence in the
continuation values for the two types.9 By successively using this equation, we can write the
diﬀerence in the continuation values as solely a function of the earnings of an individual who is a
low type in period t and remains one thereafter. Denote by H◦ (ht) the set of histories following
ah i s t o r yht in which in all the periods including and after t the individual has low ability. Let
h◦
t+j denote an element of H◦ (ht). Then we can use (1) to show:
9 That is, the diﬀerence between E[Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ t+1;σ)|θt = θH ]a n d
E[Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ t+1;σ)|θt = θL ].
10Lemma 3 Let (x,y) be an allocation satisfying ICH(ht) with equality for all periods t and all
histories ht. Then, the utility of an individual with history ht who is a high type in period t can
be written as:
Vt ((x,y),h t,θ H;σ)=Vt ((x,y),h t,θ L;σ)+
T−t X
j=0







This result can in turn be used to establish:
Lemma 4 Suppose that σ =0and let (x,y) solve the Relaxed Problem. Then the earnings path
y solves the problem:
max
PT−1







s.t. G ≤ (1 − δ)
PT













The problem described in Lemma 4 is straightforward to solve. Letting γ be the multiplier on
the revenue constraint, the associated Lagrangian can be written as
L=
PT
t=1 δt−1E[yt(ht,θ t) − ϕ(
yt(ht,θt)












The ﬁrst term is Marshallian aggregate surplus, while the second term represents the loss of
surplus resulting from having to meet the incentive constraints. Letting h∗
t = h◦
1+(t−1),t h eﬁrst






and for all t and ht = h∗
t















As we show in the proof of Proposition 1, the value of the multiplier γ is such that µ>1/γ (1 − δ),
so that the right hand side of (6) is positive.
Before we study the implications of these conditions, we ﬁrst clarify the relationship between
the Relaxed and Second Best Problems.
Lemma 5 Suppose that σ =0 .L e t(x,y) be an allocation with the property that the earnings path
solves the problem described in Lemma 4 and the consumption path is such as to make UL and
ICH(ht) (for all t and ht)h o l dw i t he q u a l i t y . T h e n ,(x,y) is a second best eﬃcient allocation.
Conversely, if (x,y) is a second best eﬃcient allocation, then the earnings path must solve the
problem described in Lemma 4.
11It follows from this result that if (x,y)i sas e c o n db e s te ﬃcient allocation then the earnings levels
satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions (5) and (6). In the next sub-section, we use this to derive some
results about the nature of second best eﬃcient allocations. Before doing that, it is worth noting
that the relationship between the Relaxed and Second Best Problems is somewhat non-standard.
In a standard problem, it is the case that any solution to the Relaxed Problem solves the Second
Best Problem. In our problem, those solutions that do not satisfy the constraints with equality
do not necessarily solve the Second Best Problem.
3.2 Second best eﬃcient allocations
We now present our ﬁrst main result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that σ =0 . Then, in any second best eﬃcient allocation, the earnings of
individuals who are currently, or have at some point been, high types are undistorted (i.e., they earn
y∗(θt) in period t when they have ability θt). The earnings of individuals who are currently and
have always been low types are distorted downwards (i.e., they earn less than y∗(θL)). However,
the extent of this distortion decreases over time and converges to 0 if T is large enough.
Proof: Let (x,y) be a second best eﬃcient allocation. Then, by Lemma 5, the earnings path




and for all t and ht = h∗
t















If an individual is currently or has at some point been a high type, then ht 6= h∗
t and, from (7), it
can be seen that the ﬁrst order conditions imply that they work up until the point at which their
marginal disutility of work ϕ0(y/θt) equals their wage θt. If an individual is currently and has
always been a low type then ht = h∗
t and, from (8), it can be seen that the ﬁrst order conditions
imply that they work less than the amount at which their marginal disutility of work equals their





is decreasing in t and
converges to zero as t →∞ .T h e ﬁrst order condition therefore implies that yt(h∗
t,θ L)/θL is
decreasing in t and (since γ must be positive) converges to y∗(θL)/θL as t →∞ .
It only remains to prove that µ>1/γ(1 − δ). Assume, ﬁrst that µ =1 /γ(1 − δ). Then (8)
implies that for all t, yt(h∗
t,θ L)=y∗(θL). This means that the earnings levels that solve the
12problem described in Lemma 4 maximize Marshallian aggregate surplus. It follows from Lemma
5 that any second best eﬃcient allocation must solve the Utilitarian Problem
max(x,y) µV1((x,y),h 1,θ H;0)+(1− µ)V1((x,y),h 1,θ L;0)
s.t. R and ICH(ht)&ICL(ht) for all t & ht.
But, by assumption, any solution to the Utilitarian Problem must violate the UL constraint.
Next suppose that µ<1/γ(1 − δ). Let y denote an earnings path that solves the problem in
Lemma 4. Let e x be such as to make ICH(ht)( f o ra l lt and ht)a n dUL hold with equality given y.
Then, we will show that (e x,y) cannot solve the Relaxed Problem - a contradiction. To see this,
consider a marginal reduction dy in y1(h1,θ L)a n dc h o o s edx so as to keep the utility of those who
are low ability in period one constant; i.e., so that
e x1(h1,θ L) − dx − ϕ(
y1(h1,θ L) − dy
θL









Note that ICH(h1) is now still satisﬁed, because the high type now ﬁnds the low type’s bundle
less attractive because it involves less earnings. However, the change in revenues is
dR =( 1− µ)[dx − dy]=( 1− µ)[
ϕ0(y1(h1,θ L)/θL)
θL
− 1]dy > 0.
This change is positive since µ<1/γ(1 − δ) implies that 1 −
ϕ0(y1(h1,θL)/θL)
θL < 0. Now take this
revenue increase and divide it among those who are high types in period one; i.e., raise e x1(h1,θ H)
by dR/µ. Clearly, this change makes the high types strictly better oﬀ, which since it violates none
of the constraints, means that (e x,y) cannot solve the Relaxed Problem. Q.E.D.
The proposition implies that the fraction of individuals in any period whose labor supply is
d i s t o r t e di na n ys e c o n db e s te ﬃcient allocation is decreasing and converges to zero as t → T when
T is large. Moreover, the degree to which these individuals have their labor supply distorted also
converges to zero. Thus, in a very strong sense, the distortions caused by imperfect observability
of individuals’ abilities vanish over time.10
10 The properties of second best eﬃcient allocations described in Proposition 1 are similar to the properties
of the monopolist’s optimal contract in Battaglini’s (2005a) pricing problem. Battaglini refers to the ﬁrst as the
“Generalized No-Distortion at the Top Principle” and the second as the “Vanishing Distortion at the Bottom
Principle”. Formally, Proposition 1 extends Battglini’s result in two ways. First, due to more general functional
forms, here we might have multiple solutions for a given target utility level for those who are initially low ability.
Proposition 1 shows that the two properties are true for any solution. Second, and more importantly, Proposition
1 shows that the two properties hold for any distribution of utilities on the second best Pareto frontier.
13To understand the ﬁrst part of the proposition, consider a group of individuals at some time
t who share the same history ht. Suppose that at some point in the past these individuals were
high ability so that ht 6= h∗
t. By Proposition 1, the earnings of these individuals are undistorted at
time t. This is obviously optimal for those with high ability at time t,s oc o n s i d e rt h o s ew i t hl o w
ability. Suppose, to the contrary, that the earnings of these individuals are distorted downwards.
Then, if we were to increase their earnings slightly in period t w ew o u l dm a k et h e mb e t t e ro ﬀ.O f
course, such a change would also necessitate an increase in the consumption of those who have high
ability at time t to prevent them from masquerading as low types. This will reduce government
revenues. However, this reduction in expected revenues can be ﬁnanced by a concordant reduction
in the consumption of these individuals in the period τ<tin which they were ﬁrst high types.
This reduction gives individuals with high ability in period τ and history hτ ¹ ht no incentive to
masquerade as low types. The reason is that the reduction in current consumption is oﬀset by the
increase in expected future consumption at time t. This marginal change in the allocation would
not cause any of the incentive constraints of low ability individuals to be violated since none of
these are binding.
To understand the second part of the proposition, it is useful to contrast it with what would
happen if ability types were constant. With constant types, the earnings of low ability individuals
a r ed i s t o r t e dd o w n w a r d sa n dt h ed e g r e eo fd i s t o r t i o ni sc o n s t a n to v e rt i m e . T h es i z eo ft h e
distortion is determined by a simple marginal cost - marginal beneﬁt argument. A lower distortion
increases the Marshallian surplus generated by an individual and therefore obviously increases
welfare. However, it also increases the consumption that needs to be given to individuals with
high ability. This reduces tax revenues for the government and increases the shadow cost of
taxation γ. At the optimum, the marginal increase in surplus is exactly compensated by the
marginal reduction in revenues. With constant abilities the marginal cost/beneﬁt ratio is constant
throughout periods. After any period t, the marginal beneﬁt of a lower distortion is proportional
to the fraction of low types (the constant 1 − µ), because types never change. Similarly, the
marginal cost is constant: it is proportional to the fraction of high types whose consumption must
be raised (the constant µ) and the shadow cost of taxation: µ − 1/γ(1 − δ).
When types change over time, the marginal cost/beneﬁt ratio is not constant, because, de-
pending on the realized history, there is a diﬀerent composition of the population. The marginal
beneﬁt of a lower distortion in the earnings of those individuals who at time t are and have always
14been low types is proportional to the fraction of such individuals in the population: (1 − µ)α
t−1
LL .
The marginal cost, evaluated at time 1, also depends on the time t of the change. At time
t the consumption of high ability individuals who have previously been low types increases by,
say, ∆Rt.A t t i m e t − 1 the expected utility of those who are and have always been low types
increases because they can become high types at time t and beneﬁt from the increase in con-
sumption at that time. Part of this extra expected utility can be taxed away at t − 1, but not
all since incentive compatibility must be satisﬁed at that time as well. At time t − 1 individ-
uals who have high ability for the ﬁrst time can not receive less than what they would receive
if they choose the option designed for those who remain low types. Even if we completely tax
away the expected increase in consumption of those who, at time t − 1, are and have always
been low types with a tax Tt−1 such that αLH∆Rt − Tt−1 = 0, those individuals who have high
ability at time t − 1 after previously being low types must receive an increase in consumption
equal to ∆Rt−1 =( αHH∆Rt − Tt−1) − (αLH∆Rt − Tt−1)=( αHH − αLH)∆Rt. Repeating the
same argument, if we try and tax away these gains at t − 2, we must provide an increase in
consumption at time t − 2 for those individuals who have high ability for the ﬁrst time equal to
∆Rt−2 =( αHH − αLH)∆Rt−1 =( αHH − αLH)
2 ∆Rt. Proceeding backward, we arrive to an in-
crease in the consumption of those who are high ability at time 1 proportional to (αHH − αLH)
t−1.
Since these individuals make up a fraction µ of the population, the marginal cost of a lower dis-
tortion in the earnings of those individuals who at time t are and have always been low types is
proportional to µ(αHH − αLH)








. As the cost/beneﬁt ratio of a lower distortion vanishes over
time,11 the distortion vanishes with it.
Proposition 1 implies that the marginal tax rates individuals face should depend upon their
entire history of earnings. What might such a non—stationary tax system look like? To provide a
feel for this, we will describe a particular tax system that can implement utility allocations on the
Pareto frontier. It should be stressed that this is not the only possibility. Given that individuals
have constant marginal utility of consumption, the allocation of consumption across time or states
is irrelevant for individuals’ utility and this gives a great deal of ﬂexibility in choosing consumption
paths and hence tax systems.





αLL < 1 because types are positively correlated.
15Consider a particular utility allocation on the Pareto frontier and let y denote the associated
earnings path. This must solve the problem described in Lemma 4. Thus, yt(ht,θ H)=y∗(θH)
for all t and ht and yt(ht,θ L)=y∗(θL) for all t and all ht 6= h∗
t. To simplify notation, let
y∗
Lt = yt(h∗
t,θ L) for all t.N o w ,c h o o s ex as follows. First, let the consumption of high types in
any period be constant, so that xt(ht,θ H)=x∗
H for all t and ht for some x∗
H. In addition, let
the consumption of those who are currently low types but have previously been high types be
constant, so that xt(ht,θ L)=x∗
L for all t and ht 6= h∗
t. Further, let this consumption be related
to x∗
H in the following way:
x∗
L = x∗
H − (ϕ(y∗(θH)/θH) − ϕ(y∗(θL)/θH)).








L − (ϕ(y∗(θL)/θH) − ϕ(y∗
Lt/θH)) + δαHL{x∗









L − ϕ(y∗(θL)/θL) − (x∗
Lt+j − ϕ(y∗
Lt+j/θL))}.
It may be veriﬁed that x so constructed is such as to make the incentive constraints ICH(ht)( f o r
all t and ht) hold with equality. To ensure UL also holds with equality, let x∗




t=1 are deﬁned by the above equations, then V1((x,y),h 1,θ L;0)=u.
Now consider the features of a tax system that could implement the allocation (x,y). In
period 1, individuals would face a schedule T1(y)t h a tr e q u i r e st h e mt op a yat a xT1(y∗(θH)) =
y∗(θH)−x∗
H if they earn y∗(θH)a n dat a xT1(y∗
L1)=y∗
L1 −x∗
L1 if they earn y∗
L1.T h i sﬁrst period
schedule has a positive marginal rate at income y∗
L1 and a zero rate at income y∗(θH).12
In the second period, the schedule individuals face depends upon their ﬁrst period earnings.
Those who earn y∗(θH)i nt h eﬁrst period face a schedule T2(y;y∗(θH)) that requires them to
pay a tax T2(y∗(θH);y∗(θH)) = y∗(θH) − x∗
H if they earn y∗(θH)a n dat a xT2(y∗(θL);y∗(θH)) =
y∗(θL)−x∗
L if they earn y∗(θL). This tax schedule has zero marginal rates in the neighborhood of
both the income levels y∗(θH)a n dy∗(θL). Those who earn y∗
L1 in the ﬁrst period, face a schedule






L1. Assuming that future taxes are locally invariant to individuals’ ﬁrst period
incomes, the schedule must be such that y∗
L1 is a local maximizer of y−T1(y)−ϕ(y/θL)a n dy∗
H is a local maximizer
of y−T1(y)−ϕ(y/θH). Since T1(y) is smooth, this requires that T0
1(y∗
L1)e q u a l1−ϕ(y∗
L1/θL)/θL which is positive
and that T0
1(y∗
H)e q u a l1− ϕ(y∗
H/θH)/θH which is zero. Of course, there is no reason that the government need
use such a smooth schedule. It could, for example, set T1(y)e q u a lt oi n ﬁnity for any y other than y∗
L1 or y∗
H.I n
this case, the notion of a marginal rate of taxation is not well deﬁned.
16T2(y;y∗
L1) that requires them to pay a tax T2(y∗(θH);y∗
L1)=y∗(θH)−x∗





L2 if they earn y∗
L2. This tax schedule has a zero marginal rate in
the neighborhood of y∗(θH) but a positive marginal rate in the neighborhood of y∗
L2.13 Thus,
the tax schedule T2(y;y∗




L1, the tax schedule T2(y;y∗
L1) has a lower marginal rate in the
neighborhood of y∗
L2 than the ﬁrst period tax schedule.
In the third period, those who had earned y∗(θH)i nt h eﬁrst period continue to face the
schedule T2(y;y∗(θH)) as do those who earned y∗(θH) in the second period. Those who earned
y∗
L1 and y∗
L2 in the ﬁrst two periods, face the schedule T3(y;y∗
L1,y∗










if they earn y∗
L3.S i n c ey∗
L3 >y ∗
L2, the tax schedule T3(y;y∗
L1,y∗
L2) involves a lower marginal rate
in the neighborhood of y∗
L3 than does the second period tax schedule. As time progresses, more
and more individuals come under the tax schedule T2(y;y∗(θH)). Moreover, the schedule faced by
those with an uninterrupted history of low earnings Tt(y;y∗
L1,..,y∗
Lt−1) converges to the schedule
T2(y;y∗(θH)).
4 Risk aversion
We now turn to the general case of risk aversion. The problem is signiﬁcantly more complicated
precisely because risk aversion introduces the incentive problem arising from the trade oﬀ between
insurance and work incentives. These complications prevent us from presenting a full characteri-
zation of second best eﬃcient allocations with risk aversion. Rather we restrict attention to the
case in which risk aversion is small. We begin with a general continuity result that establishes that
the distortions in earnings are small when the degree of risk aversion is small. We then provide a
more detailed analysis of the two period case.
4.1 The general case
For all σ,l e tΨ(σ) be the set of solutions to the Second Best Problem corresponding to σ and
let V1(σ) denote the value function for the problem; that is, V1(σ)=V1((x,y),θ H,h 1;σ)f o r
(x,y) ∈ Ψ(σ). Our ﬁr s tr e s u l ti s :
Lemma 6 The value function V1(σ) is continuous at σ =0 .
13 Again, this assumes that future taxes are locally invariant to second period earnings.
17This result tells us that the problem is well-behaved as a function of the risk aversion parameter.
Next we show that as the degree of risk aversion gets smaller, the earnings levels converge to
those that are optimal under risk neutrality.
Lemma 7 For all ε>0 there exists a σε > 0 and an earnings path y∗ which solves the problem










Combining these results, we obtain our second main result:
Proposition 2 For any ε>0,t h e r ee x i s t saσε > 0 such that if σ ∈ (0,σ ε), in any second best
eﬃcient allocation, the distortion in the earnings of individuals who are either currently high types
or who have previously been high types is less than ε. Furthermore, when T is suﬃciently large,
for any ε>0 there exists a σε > 0 and a tε such that if σ ∈ (0,σ ε), in any second best eﬃcient
allocation, the distortion in the earnings of individuals who have always been low types is less than
ε in periods t ∈ {tε,...,T}.
Thus, the only individuals whose earnings are signiﬁc a n t l yd i s t o r t e di na n yp e r i o dt are those
who were initally low types and have remained low types. This is a declining fraction of the
population. Moreover, if T is large enough, then as t → T the distortion in the earnings of even
these individuals vanishes. The bottom line then is that the basic lesson of the analysis of the risk
neutral case - namely, that distortions vanish - is robust to the introduction of small amounts of
risk aversion.
4.2 The two period case
To solve for second best eﬃcient allocations we again consider the Relaxed Problem obtained by
ignoring the incentive constraints for low types. This is tractable because there are only three
incentive constraints. While we are no longer able to prove generally that second best eﬃcient
allocations must solve the Relaxed Problem, we can show that this is the case for σ suﬃciently
small.
Lemma 8 Suppose that T =2 .T h e n , t h e r e e x i s t s a σ>0 such that if σ ∈ (0,σ), (x,y) is a
second best eﬃcient allocation if and only if it solves the Relaxed Problem.
By analyzing the ﬁrst order conditions for the Relaxed Problem, we are able to establish:
Proposition 3 Suppose that T =2 .T h e n ,t h e r ee x i s t saσ>0 such that if σ ∈ (0,σ),i na n y
second best eﬃcient allocation, the earnings of individuals who are high types in either period
are undistorted. The earnings of individuals who are low types in either period are distorted
18downwards. However, the degree of distortion in the earnings of those who become low types in
the second period converges to 0 as σ → 0. Moreover, those who are low types in both periods earn
more in the second period.
This proposition shows that once we introduce risk aversion, the result that in any second best
eﬃcient allocation only those who remain low types have their labor supply decisions distorted no
longer holds. Those who start out as high types and become low types in the second period, also
work less than the eﬃcient amount. However, the basic pattern of earnings in any second best
eﬃcient allocation is the same as in the risk neutral case. In particular, the earnings of those who
remain low types are increasing.
With risk aversion, the allocation of consumption across time and states is relevant for indi-
viduals’ utility and this explains why the earnings of individuals with history HL are distorted
downwards. Reducing these earnings level lessens the incentive of those with history HH to pre-
tend they have history HL. In the risk neutral case, this problem could be handled by increasing
the consumption of those with history HH and taking the expected discounted value from high
ability individuals in the ﬁrst period. But, because individuals want to smooth their consumption,
this intertemporal reallocation is no longer without cost.
What can be established about the allocation of consumption across time and states in a second
best eﬃcient allocation? Our next proposition addresses this.
Proposition 4 Suppose that T =2 .T h e n ,t h e r ee x i s t saσ>0 such that if σ ∈ (0,σ),i na n y
second best eﬃcient allocation the consumption of individuals who are high types in the ﬁrst period
goes up if they remain high types in the second period and down if they become low types. Similarly,
the consumption of individuals who are low types in the ﬁr s tp e r i o dg o e su pi ft h e ya r eh i g ht y p e s
in the second period and down if they are low types. Moreover, for both low and high types, the
marginal utility of consumption in the ﬁrst period is strictly less than the expected marginal utility
of consumption in the second period.
Thus, when compared with eﬃcient allocations there are two distinct distortions in the allo-
cation of consumption. First, the allocation of con s u m p t i o na c r o s ss t a t e si sd i s t o r t e di nt h es e n s e
that individuals are not fully insured. If they are low types in the second period, their consump-
tion is lower than if they are high types. This is obviously a necessary condition for incentive
compatibility. Second, the allocation of consumption across time is distorted in the sense that
individuals consume more than is optimal in the ﬁrst period. This is a particular application of the
result ﬁrst established by Rogerson (1985) and since generalized and applied to optimal taxation
19by Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinsky (2003).14 The intuition is the following. Because of the
incentive compatibility constraint, low types will supply less labor and enjoy lower consumption
in each period. The marginal utility of consumption of low types, therefore, is higher than the
marginal utility of high types in period two. Suppose, to the contrary, that the marginal utility
of consumption in the ﬁrst period were higher than the expected marginal utility in the second
period for some type. If we reduce the second period consumption of high and low types by some
amount ∆ incentive compatibility is preserved, since the utility of low types is reduced by more
than that of high types. This reduction frees ∆ units of consumption that can be used to increase
consumption in the ﬁrst period. But then, since the marginal increase in utility at t =1i sh i g h e r
that the expected reduction at t = 2, the change creates a Pareto improvement: and we have a
contradiction.
Constructing a tax system that can implement second best eﬃcient allocations with risk aver-
sion is a more complex problem because of the need to simultaneously provide correct earnings
and savings incentives. Moreover, it is not the case that we can infer marginal rates of taxation
from the distortions in earnings and consumption across periods. In particular, there is no general
guarantee that, under a tax system in which marginal rates reﬂect the distortions associated with
a particular second best eﬃcient allocation, individuals will select the bundles intended for them.
We refer the interested reader to Kocherlakota (2005) for a detailed analysis of this problem.
5 Time consistency
Imagine that at the beginning of period one the government announces a tax/transfer system de-
signed to implement a particular utility allocation on the second best Pareto frontier. Individuals’
period one earnings choices would then reveal their period one types. If the government could use
this information to design a new tax/transfer system that was better for all individuals and raised
just as much revenue, one might imagine that it would be tempted to do so. In this case, we will
say that the original tax/transfer system is not time consistent.
This notion of time consistency is based on Pareto dominance. The underlying idea is that it
14 It is worth noting that we establish that the inequality is strict, while Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinsky
(2003) prove only a weak inequality. Following Rogerson (1985), their argument is based on Jensen’s Inequality.
However, to obtain a strict inequality this argument requires that consumption levels are state contingent. That
this is indeed the case in every period of a general T period model is yet to be proven and is by no means an
obvious result.
20is likely to be politically diﬃcult for a government to make policy changes that reduce the beneﬁts
previously promised to some group of society. This might be regarded as unfair even by those who
are not aﬀected. It would however be much harder to argue that a policy change that increases
all citizens’ utility should not be chosen. Accordingly, if a previously announced policy cannot be
Pareto dominated, then there will exist political forces to help it survive. But in the case of Pareto
dominance, a policy will be removed and hence would not be time consistent. While other notions
of time consistency could doubtless be proposed, in our view, this is a natural way of modelling
it.
Up to this point, we have ignored this time consistency problem, implicitly assuming that the
government can credibly commit to the ex ante optimal tax/transfer system. The equilibrium
characterized in Section 4, is therefore a Ramsey equilibrium (Ramsey (1927)): the government
determines the optimal policy given individuals’ reaction functions. However, it is well known that
even benevolent governments ﬁnd it ex post optimal to depart from Ramsey optimal policies.15
In a model like ours, distortionary taxation is necessary to extract individuals’ private information
but after individuals have revealed it, the government can improve their welfare by eliminating
distortions (Roberts (1984)). This means that optimal tax systems in dynamic models with con-
stant ability types can be ex post Pareto dominated and hence are not time consistent according
to our deﬁnition.
In this section we show that when individuals’ types can vary stochastically the time-inconsistency
problem (as we have deﬁned it) may not arise. To analyze the issue we return to the case of risk
neutral individuals. We also impose the additional assumption that the marginal disutility of
labor is convex; i.e., ϕ000(l) ≥ 0.16 This assumption guarantees that Φ00 > 0 which in turn implies
that the Lagrangian for the maximization problem in Lemma 4 is strictly concave and that the
eﬃcient earnings levels are unique.
We begin by providing a formal deﬁnition of time consistency. We will work directly with
allocations rather than the tax-transfer systems that generate them. It is to be understood that a
particular tax/transfer system is time consistent if and only if the allocation it generates is time
consistent. Consider then a particular second best eﬃcient allocation (x∗,y∗) and imagine that
15 The classic reference is Kydland and Prescott (1977). See Chari, Kehoe and Prescott (1988) and Stokey (1989)
for general discussion and surveys of the literature.
16 This condition is satisﬁed by most common cost functions such as quadratic, logarithmic or exponential.
21we are at the beginning of some period t ≥ 2. At that point, the government knows the histories
of all the individuals in the economy but not their period t types. Consider a group of individuals
with history ht. We are interested in whether the government can change the future allocation
intended for these individuals in such a way as to make them better oﬀ while still raising the same
revenue from them.
Let (xht,yht) denote a future allocation for those individuals who at time t have history ht;
i.e.,
(xht,yht)={(xt+j(ht+j,θ t+j),y t+j(ht+j,θ t+j)) | ∀ ht+j º ht}
T−t
j=0.












t+j(ht+j,θ t+j) − x∗
t+j(ht+j,θ t+j) | ht].
Now consider the problem:
max(xht,yht) Vt ((x,y),h t,θ H;σ)
s.t. Vt ((x,y),h t,θ L;σ) ≥ Vt ((x∗,y∗),h t,θ L;σ)
PT−t
j=0 δjE[yt+j(ht+j,θ t+j) − xt+j(ht+j,θ t+j)|ht] ≥ R∗
t (ht)
and ICH(ht+j)&ICL(ht+j) for all ht+j º ht and j =0 ,1,..
(PI
ht)
Thus, we seek to maximize the expected utility of those individuals with history ht who are high
types at time t, subject to the constraints that: (i) those who are low types in period t with
history ht obtain at least as much utility as they obtain under (x∗
ht,y∗
ht), (ii) the same expected
revenue is raised from these individuals as under (x∗
ht,y∗
ht), and, (iii) the incentive compatibility
constraints for these individuals in period t and beyond are satisﬁed. Clearly, (x∗
ht,y∗
ht)s a t i s ﬁes
all the constraints of this problem. If (x∗
ht,y∗
ht) solves it, then the government cannot change the
future allocation intended for individuals with history ht in such a way as to make them better oﬀ
while still raising the same revenue from them. Therefore, we say that (x∗,y∗)i stime consistent
if for all periods t ≥ 2a n da l lh i s t o r i e sht,( x∗
ht,y∗
ht)i sas o l u t i o nt oPI
ht.
We now have:
Lemma 9 Suppose that σ =0and let (x∗,y∗) be a second best eﬃcient allocation. Then, (x∗,y∗)









where γ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the maximization problem described in Lemma
4 that is solved by y∗.
The intuition underlying this result is the following. When ability types are perfectly correlated,
under the Ramsey tax system the government faces no residual uncertainty in period two and
beyond. Because of this, it could impose lump sum taxes from that point on and eliminate all
distortions in individuals’ labor supply. Accordingly, Ramsey optimal taxes can never be time
consistent. When types are stochastic, residual uncertainty remains because an individual may
change type. Thus, the government must still screen types in the remaining periods. Condition (9)
guarantees that the ex post optimal distortion is the same as the ex ante optimal distortion. When
this is the case, two competing forces oﬀset each other. On the one hand, in order to create a Pareto
improvement, the government must introduce a new t a xs y s t e mt h a ti n v o l v e sl e s sd i s t o r t i o n st h a n
the original one. This necessitates increasing the earnings of those individuals whose earnings are
distorted who, by Proposition 2, are those who currently are and always have been low types.
On the other hand, increasing the earnings of these individuals requires compensating increases
in consumption for those individuals with the same history who have become high types. When
condition (9) is satisﬁed, these compensating increases in consumption are suﬃcient to oﬀset the
revenue gains from the higher earnings of those who are still low types and the net impact on
revenue is negative.
From Lemma 9, we can derive our third main result:
Proposition 5 Suppose that σ =0and let (x∗,y∗) be a second best eﬃcient allocation. Then
(i) if αLH/αHH ≥ µ, (x∗,y∗) is time consistent, and, (ii) if αLH/αHH ∈ (0,µ) there exists a
threshold Ω∗ such that (x∗,y∗) is time consistent if and only if G +( 1− δ)u ≤ Ω∗.
To understand how this result follows from the Lemma, note that the right hand side of condition
(9) is increasing in γ and converges to µ as γ approaches ∞. Accordingly, condition (9) is necessar-
ily satisﬁed when αLH/αHH exceeds µ which implies part (i).17 In the intermediate case, whether
the condition is satisﬁed depends upon the precise value of the Lagrange multiplier γ associated
17 It is interesting to note that when µ is equal to the fraction of high ability types in the stationary distribution
o ft h eM a r k o vp r o c e s sd e s c r i b i n gt h ee v o l u t i o no ft h ei n d i v iduals’ income generating abilities, the condition in (i)
is satisﬁed if αHH ≤ (1 + αLH)/2.
23with y∗. The smaller it is, the more likely is the condition to be satisﬁed. Since γ represents the
marginal value of a unit relaxation in the government’s revenue requirement, the degree to which
it exceeds 1/µ(1 − δ) will depend upon the tightness of the incentive constraints. This in turn
w i l ld e p e n do nt h es i z eo ft h er e v e n u er e q u i r e m e n tG and on the amount of redistribution the
government intends to do as measured by u.18
This proposition has two interesting implications. First, no matter how strong the correlation
between types, if it is anything less than perfect, there are conditions under which the Ramsey
optimal policy will be sustainable. This justiﬁes our claim in the introduction that Pareto eﬃcient
income tax systems can be time-consistent even when the degree of correlation in ability types is
large. Second, in the case in which αLH/αHH ∈ (0,µ), Pareto eﬃcient tax systems will be time
consistent only when the government’s revenue requirement and its redistributive goals are “not
too large”. Thus, ceteris paribus, a government that starts with higher spending commitments
(for example, higher debt to repay) or more ambitious redistributive objectives will ﬁnd it harder
to implement second best optimal policies.
This second implication suggests a theoretical reason why the classic equity-eﬃciency trade oﬀ
(see, for example, Okun (1975)) may be steeper than previously thought. A well-known lesson of
public economics is that achieving stronger equity objectives requires more distortionary taxation
which reduces the size of the aggregate pie. Indeed, the Mirrlees model is designed precisely to
illustrate and quantify this trade oﬀ. Proposition 6 suggests that, in dynamic economies, stronger
equity objectives might lead second best optimal policies to be time inconsistent. This will force
governments to achieve their equity objectives with third best policies.19 These will lead to
greater distortions and larger reductions in the aggregate pie than suggested by the Mirrlees
model.
18 Proposition 5 is related to Battaglini’s (2005a) result on the renegotiation proofness of the monopolist’s optimal
contract. Formally, it extends his result by showing which points on the second best frontier are time consistent.
In particular, it shows that those involving a higher target utility for those who are initially low ability are less
l i k e l yt ob et i m ec o n s i s t e n t .
19 Understanding what these third best policies look like is a challenging problem because when the government
cannot commit, the Revelation Principle does not hold. In a two period Principal-Agent model with variable types,
Battaglini (2005b) fully characterizes the optimal renegotiation proof contract extending the Revelation Principle
to this dynamic environment. He shows that when the second best optimal contract is not time consistent, the
third best optimal contract involves the agent playing a mixed strategy. The optimal contract induces the high
type agent to partially pool with the low type in the ﬁrst period; and the degree of pooling monotonically increases
with the level of types’ persistence. Berliant and Ledyard (2003) also study third best policies in a two period
optimal tax model with a continuum of constant ability types. They provide conditions under which the optimal
tax scheme involves screening types with distortionary taxes in the ﬁrst period and non-distortionary lump sum
taxes in the second period. These second period lump sum taxes depend only upon ﬁrst period earnings.
246 Conclusion
The problem of optimal taxation in a world in which individuals’ income generating abilities, while
persistent, may vary over time raises three general theoretical questions. First, what is the pattern
of distortions in individuals’ earnings choices and how do these vary over time? Second, what are
the pattern of distortions in the allocation of consumption across states and time? Third, under
what circumstances are eﬃcient tax systems time consistent? This paper has tried to shed light
on these questions by investigated Pareto eﬃcient income taxation in a simple dynamic economy
with individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov process.
The bulk of the analysis has assumed that individuals are risk neutral which makes the problem
of consumption smoothing moot and permits a clean focus on the ﬁrst and third questions. With
respect to earnings distortions, the paper shows that, in the risk neutral case, in any period the
only individuals who face a positive marginal income tax rate are those who started with low
ability and have always been low ability. This is a declining fraction of the population, converging
to zero if the time horizon is long enough. In addition, the tax rate these individuals face decreases
over time, also converging to zero if the time horizon is long enough. Thus, in an eﬃcient income
tax system, earnings distortions vanish over time.
The paper shows that with risk aversion, the result that any individual who is currently
a high type or who has been previously a high type faces a zero marginal tax rate no longer
holds. However, it also shows that the distortion in the earnings of these individuals is small
for small degrees of risk aversion. Thus, the basic insight that earnings distortions vanish is
robust to introducing small amounts of risk aversion. When risk aversion is high, the tendency
toward eﬃciency that this paper identiﬁes would still be a force in shaping optimal taxes but other
considerations arise. Thus, our results should be considered a starting point for the understanding
of the pattern of earnings distortions rather than a deﬁnitive account.
With respect to time consistency, the paper shows that, in the risk neutral case, Pareto eﬃcient
income tax systems can be time-consistent even when the degree of correlation in ability types is
large. Moreover, time consistency is more likely when governments have less progressive policy
agendas (i.e., lower spending and less redistribution). As we have argued, this provides a theoret-
ical rationale for believing that the equity-eﬃciency trade oﬀ may be steeper than suggested by
the static Mirrlees model.
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277A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :It is obvious that UL holds with equality, so we will just show that ICH (h1)
is binding. Let (b x,b y) solve the relaxed problem and suppose that ICH (h1) is not binding. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that for all t>1a n dh i s t o r i e sht, the constraint ICH(ht)i sn o t
binding. To see this, suppose that for some time period b t and some history he t = {θ1,...,θe t−1},
ICH(he t) were binding. Suppose ﬁrst that θ1 = θH. Then consider the allocation (x,b y)i nw h i c h
xe t(he t,θ H)=b xe t(he t,θ H)+ε; xe t(he t,θ L)=b xe t(he t,θ L);
and x1(h1,θ H)=b x1(h1,θ H) − δ
e t−1εPr((he t,θ H)|θ1 = θH )
for ε>0 and all the remaining consumptions are unchanged. Observe that the expected utility




δt−1xt(ht,θ t)|θ1 = θH ]=E[
T X
t=1
δt−1b xt(ht,θ t)|θ1 = θH ].
It follows that (x,b y)s a t i s ﬁes ICH(h1) and yields the same value of the objective function as (b x,b y).
It is also satisﬁes R and UL.N e x ts u p p o s et h a tθ1 = θL. Then consider the allocation (x,b y)i n
which
xe t(he t,θ H)=b xe t(he t,θ H)+ε; xe t(he t,θ L)=b xe t(he t,θ L);
and x1(h1,θ L)=b x1(h1,θ L) − δ
e t−1εPr((he t,θ H)|θ1 = θL)
for ε>0 and all the remaining consumptions are unchanged. Observe that the expected utility




δt−1xt(ht,θ t)|θ1 = θL]=E[
∞ X
t=1
δt−1b xt(ht,θ t)|θ1 = θL].
It follows that (x,b y)s a t i s ﬁes UL. It also yields the same value of the objective function as (b x,b y)
and satisﬁes R.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eICH (h1) is not binding under (b x,b y)i tw i l ln o tb eb i n d i n gu n d e r
(x,b y)f o rε suﬃciently small.
It follows from this that (b x,b y)s o l v e st h eE ﬃciency Problem
max(x,y) V1((x,y),h 1,θ H;0)
s.t. UL and R.
28This means that the earnings path b y maximizes Marshallian aggregate surplus
T X
t=1




and the consumption path b x is such that UL and R hold with equality. Moreover, for all t and
histories ht the constraints ICH(ht)a r es a t i s ﬁed but slack. Now, by transferring consumption
from the high type to the low type in each period and after every history, create an alternative
consumption path e x that for all t and histories ht makes the constraints ICH(ht)b i n dw h e nt h e
earnings path is b y. The allocation (e x,b y) so created can be shown to satisfy for all t and histories
ht the constraints ICL(ht)( s e et h ep r o o fo fL e m m a5b e l o w ) . M o r e o v e r ,i ts t r i c t l ys a t i s ﬁes the
UL constraint and (given constant marginal utility) solves the Utilitarian Problem
max(x,y) µV1((x,y),h 1,θ H;0)+(1− µ)V1((x,y),h 1,θ L;0)
s.t. R and ICH(ht)&ICL(ht) for all t & ht.
But, by assumption, if (x,y) solves the Utilitarian Problem, then it must be the case that
V1((x,y),h 1,θ L;0)<u- a contradiction. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :Let (x,y) be an allocation satisfying the constraints of the Relaxed Problem.
We will show that for all t =2 ,...,T we can ﬁnd xt such that the allocation (xt,y): (i) satisﬁes all
the constraints and yields the same value of the objective function as (x,y), (ii) satisﬁes ICH(hτ)
with equality for all periods τ ∈ {2,...,t} and all histories hτ, and, (iii) is identical to (x,y)f o r
all periods τ>tand all histories hτ. This implies the result.
We prove our claim by induction. Consider the claim for t = 2. Suppose that ICH (h2)i sn o t
binding after some history h2. Suppose ﬁrst that h2 = {θL}, so that the high type was a low type
in period 1. Since ICH (h2) is not binding, there must exist some ε>0s u c ht h a t :
V2((x,y),h 2,θ H;0)=x2(h2,θ L) − ϕ(
y2(h2,θ L)
θH
)+δE[V3((x,y),h 2,θ L,θ 3;0)|θ2 = θH ]+ε
Now let x2 satisfy
x2
2(h2,θ H)=x2(h2,θ H) − ε; x2
2(h2,θ L)=x2(h2,θ L)
x2
1(h1,θ L)=x1(h1,θ L)+δαLHε; x2
1(h1,θ H)=x1(h1,θ H)
and otherwise equals x. Thus, all we have done is to take consumption away from the high type
after history h2 and give the expected discounted value to the low type in period one. Clearly,
29this does not eﬀect the value of the objective function. Nor does it eﬀect the R or UL constraints.
It satisﬁes the ICH(h2) constraint with equality by construction. We need to check that the
ICH(h1)c o n s t r a i n ti ss a t i s ﬁed; i.e., that:
V1((x2,y),h 1,θ H;0)≥ x2
1(h1,θ L) − ϕ(
y1(h1,θ L)
θH
)+δE[V2((x2,y),h 1,θ L,θ 2;0)|θ1 = θH ].
We have that:
V1((x2,y),h 1,θ H;0) = x2
1(h1,θ H) − ϕ(
y1(h1,θ H)
θH
)+δE[V2((x2,y),h 1,θ H,θ 2;0)|θ1 = θH ].
= V1((x,y),h 1,θ H;0)
≥ x1(h1,θ L) − ϕ(
y1(h1,θ L)
θH
)+δE[V2((x,y),h 1,θ L,θ 2;0)|θ1 = θH ].
= x2
1(h1,θ L) − δεαLH − ϕ(
y1(h1,θ L)
θH
)+δE[V2((x2,y),h 1,θ L,θ 2;0)|θ1 = θH ]+δεαHH
≥ x2
1(h1,θ L) − ϕ(
y1(h1,θ L)
θH
)+δE[V2((x2,y),h 1,θ L,θ 2;0)|θ1 = θH ]
where the third equality follows from the fact that (x,y)s a t i s ﬁes ICH(h1)a n dt h eﬁfth follows
from the fact that αHH ≥ αLH.
Next suppose that h2 = {θH} so that the high type was also a high type in period 1. Again,
there must exist some ε>0s u c ht h a t :
V2((x,y),h 2,θ H;0)=x2(h2,θ L) − ϕ(
y2(h2,θ L)
θH
)+δE[V3((x,y),h 2,θ L,θ 3;0)|θ2 = θH ]+ε.
Again, we will show that we can ﬁnd an alternative allocation that yields at least the same value
of the objective function, satisﬁes all the constraints of the relaxed problem and has the property
that ICH (h2) is binding. Now let x2 be deﬁned by:
x2
2(h2,θ H)=x2(h2,θ H) − ε; x2
2(h2,θ L)=x2(h2,θ L)
x2
1(h1,θ H)=x1(h1,θ H)+δαLHε; x2
1(h1,θ L)=x1(h1,θ L)
and equals x otherwise. Thus, all we have done is to take consumption away from the high type
after history h2 and give the expected discounted value to the high type in period 1. Clearly, this
does not eﬀect the value of the objective function. Nor does it eﬀect the R or UL constraints. It
satisﬁes the ICH(h2) constraint with equality by construction and has no eﬀect on the ICH(h1)
constraint.
Now suppose that the claim is true for τ =2 ,...,t − 1 and consider the claim for t.S i n c et h e
claim is true for t − 1, we can ﬁnd xt−1 such that: (i) the allocation (xt−1,y)s a t i s ﬁes all the
30constraints and yields the same value of the objective function as (x,y), (ii) satisﬁes ICH(hτ)
with equality for all periods τ ∈ {2,...,t − 1} and all histories hτ, and, (iii) is identical to (x,y)
for all periods τ>t − 1a n da l lh i s t o r i e shτ.I f ( xt−1,y) is such that ICH (ht)i sb i n d i n gf o r
all histories ht then we can simply let xt = xt−1. I ft h i si sn o tt h ec a s e ,t h e r em u s te x i s ts o m e
history ht such that ICH (ht) is not binding. Again, there are two possibilities, ht = {ht−1,θ L}
and ht = {ht−1,θ H}. In either case, in the same manner as above, we can ﬁnd e x such that the
allocation (e x,y): (i) yields the same value of the objective function as (xt−1,y) (and hence (x,y)),
(ii) satisﬁes ICH(ht) with equality, and, (iii) equals (xt−1,y) (and hence (x,y)) for all periods
τ>tand all histories hτ.I fht = {ht−1,θ H} then e x will also satisfy ICH(hτ) with equality for
all periods τ ∈ {2,...,t − 1} so we can let xt = e x.I f ht = {ht−1,θ L} and αHH >α LH,t h e n
ICH(ht−1) will hold strictly. However, in this case, since the claim is true for τ = t − 1w ec a n
ﬁnd b x such that the allocation (b x,y): (i) satisﬁes all the constraints and yields the same value of
the objective function as (e x,y), (ii) satisﬁes ICH(hτ) with equality for all periods τ ∈ {2,...,t−1}
and all histories hτ, and, (iii) is identical to (e x,y) for all periods τ>t − 1a n da l lh i s t o r i e shτ.
We can then let xt = b x. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :F r o m( 1 )w eh a v et h a t :
Vt ((x,y),h t,θ H;σ)=Vt ((x,y),h t,θ L;σ)+Φ(yt(ht,θ L)) + ∆EVt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ t+1;σ)
In addition, we can write
∆EVt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ t+1;σ)=δ(αHH − αLH)Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ H;σ)
+δ (αHL − αLL)Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ L;σ).
But from (1) we know that:
Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ H;σ)=Vt+1 ((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ L;σ)+Φ(yt+1((ht,θ L),θ L))
+∆EVt+2((x,y),(ht,θ L,θ L),θ t+2;σ)
= Vt+1 ((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ L;σ)+Φ(yt+1((ht,θ L),θ L))
+δ (αHH − αLH)Vt+2((x,y),(ht,θ L,θ L),θ H;σ)
+δ (αHL − αLL)Vt+2((x,y),(ht,θ L,θ L),θ L;σ).
31Thus, it is the case that
∆EVt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ t+1;σ)=δ (αHH − αLH)Φ(yt+1((ht,θ L),θ L))
+δ2 (αHH − αLH)
2 Vt+2((x,y),(ht,θ L,θ L),θ H;σ)
+δ2 (αHH − αLH)(αHL − αLL)Vt+2((x,y),(ht,θ L,θ L),θ L;σ).
But again from (1) we have that
Vt+2((x,y),(ht,θ L,θ L),θ H;σ)=Vt+2((x,y),(ht,θ L,θ L),θ L;σ)+Φ(yt+2((ht,θ L,θ L),θ L))
+δ (αHH − αLH)Vt+3((x,y),(ht,θ L,θ L,θ L),θ H;σ)
+δ (αHL − αLL)Vt+3((x,y),(ht,θ L,θ L,θ L),θ L;σ).
So that
∆EVt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ t+1;σ)=δ (αHH − αLH)Φ(yt+1((ht,θ L),θ L))
+δ2 (αHH − αLH)
2 Φ(yt+2((ht,θ L,θ L),θ L))
+δ3 (αHH − αLH)
3 Vt+3((x,y),(ht,θ L,θ L,θ L),θ H;σ)
+δ3 (αHH − αLH)
2 (αHL − αLL)Vt+3((x,y),(ht,θ L,θ L,θ L),θ L;σ).











a n dw eh a v et h ec l a i m e de x p r e s s i o n .Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :Let (x,y) solve the Relaxed Problem. Then by Lemmas 1 and 2 we may
assume with no loss of generality that x is such that (x,y)s a t i s ﬁes UL and all the incentive











The resource constraint can be written as G ≤ (1 − δ)
PT
t=1 δt−1E[yt(ht,θ t) − xt(ht,θ t)]. By




δt−1E[xt(ht,θ t) − ϕ(
yt(ht,θ t)
θt












δt−1E[xt(ht,θ t)] = µ
T X
t=1
δt−1E[xt(ht,θ t)|θ1 = θH ]+( 1− µ)
T X
t=1
δt−1E[xt(ht,θ t)|θ1 = θL]






)|θ1 = θH ]














Substituting this into the resource constraint, yields
G ≤ (1 − δ)
T X
t=1
δt−1E[yt(ht,θ t) − µV1((x,y),h 1,θ H;0)




U s i n gL e m m a3a n dUL we can write this as
G ≤ (1 − δ)
T X
t=1














Thus, it follows that the earnings path y must maximize the objective function (10) subject to
the constraint (11). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 : Let (x,y) be an allocation with the property that the earnings path
solves the problem described in Lemma 4 and the consumption path is such as to make UL and
ICH(ht) (for all t and ht) hold with equality. We know that (x,y) is a solution to the Relaxed
Problem. To show that it solves the Second Best Problem, all we need show is that the low type’s
incentive constraint ICL(ht)i ss a t i s ﬁed for all t and ht.F o rag i v e np e r i o dt and history ht,t h i s
requires showing that
xt(ht,θ L) − ϕ(
yt(ht,θ L)
θL
)+δE[Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ t+1;0)|θt = θL]
≥ xt(ht,θ H) − ϕ(
yt(ht,θ H)
θL
)+δE[Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ H),θ t+1;0)|θt = θL]
33or, equivalently, that







+δE[Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ H),θ t+1;0)− Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ t+1;0)|θt = θL]
From the fact that ICH(ht) holds with equality, we have that







δE[Vt+1((x,y),θ t+1,(ht,θ H),0) − Vt+1((x,y),θ t+1,(ht,θ L),0)|θt = θH ].
We can use this to prove the desired inequality.
Note ﬁrst that
δE[Vt+1((x,y),θ t+1,(ht,θ H),0) − Vt+1((x,y),θ t+1,(ht,θ L),0)|θt = θH ]
is at least as big as
δE[Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ H),θ t+1;0)− Vt+1((x,y),(ht,θ L),θ t+1;0)|θt = θL].
To see this, denote the diﬀerence between the former and the latter by ∆. Computing this
diﬀerence yields
∆ =( αHH − αLH)[Vt+1((x,y),θ H,(ht,θ H);0) − Vt+1((x,y),θ H,(ht,θ L);0)]
+(αHL − αLL)[Vt+1((x,y),θ L,(ht,θ H);0) − Vt+1((x,y),θ L,(ht,θ L);0)].
By assumption under the allocation (x,y) all the incentive constraints for the high type are
binding. Thus, by the same argument used to establish Lemma 3, we can write
Vt+1((x,y),θ H,(ht,θ H);0) − Vt+1((x,y),θ H,(ht,θ L);0)
= Vt+1((x,y),θ L,(ht,θ H);0) +
T−(t+1) X
j=0
δj[αHH − αLH]jΦ(yt+1+j(θL,(ht,θ H)o
t+1+j))
−Vt+1((x,y),θ L,(ht,θ L);0) −
T−(t+1) X
j=0
δj[αHH − αLH]jΦ(yt+1+j((θL,(ht,θ L)o
t+1+j)).



















Thus, for all j, yt+1+j((ht,θ H)◦
t+1+j,θ L) ≥ yt+1+j((ht,θ L)◦
t+1+j,θ L). Since Φ0 ≥ 0, it follows that
the above diﬀerence is non-negative.














To see this, note ﬁr s tt h a tf o ra l lt and histories ht, yt(ht,θ L)i sl e s st h a nyt(ht,θ H). Second, note








is increasing in θ. It follows from these two claims and from (12) and (13) that ICL(ht)i ss a t i s ﬁed.
Conversely, let (x,y) be a solution to the Second Best Problem. We need to show that the
earnings path y solves the problem described in Lemma 4. Suppose not. Then (x,y)c a n n o ts o l v e
the Relaxed Problem. Let (x0,y0) be a solution to the Relaxed Problem with y0 6= y.T h e n b y
Lemma 4, we know that y0 solves the problem described in Lemma 4. Moreover, we can assume
by Lemmas 1 and 2 without loss of generality that x0 is such that (x0,y0)s a t i s ﬁes ICH(ht)w i t h
equality for all ht and that UL binds. But then it follows by the above argument that (x0,y0)
satisﬁes ICL(ht) for all t and ht.T h i si sac o n t r a d i c t i o n .Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :Recall that an allocation in this economy is described by (x,y)={(xt(ht,θ t),y t(ht,θ t))}T
t=1
or, equivalently, (x,y)={(xt(ht+1),y t(ht+1))}T
t=1.L e t z denote the set of all allocations. We


















35The set of allocations z together with the metric d(·,·) is a metric space.
Let Ω(σ) denote, for each σ ∈ [0,1), the subset of allocations satisfying the constraints of the
Second Best Problem and let Ψ(σ) be the set of solutions corresponding to σ.L e tV1(σ)d e n o t e
the value function for the problem. We ﬁrst note the following useful fact.
Fact A.1: The constraint set correspondence Ω(σ) of the Second Best Problem is upper hemi
continuous.
Proof: Since all the constraints of the problem are expressed as weak inequalities and involve con-
tinuous functions, each of them deﬁnes a compact valued, upper hemi continuous correspondence.
By Theorem 14.24 in Aliprantis and Border [1994] the intersection of these correspondences is
also upper hemi continuous. ¥
We can now prove the Lemma. Let ε>0 be given. Then we must show that there exists σε > 0
such that for any σ ∈ (0,σ ε)w eh a v et h a t
|V1(σ) − V1(0)| <ε .
We begin by demonstrating the existence of σε > 0 such that for any σ ∈ (0,σ ε)w eh a v et h a t
V1(σ) ≥ V1(0) − ε. This is accomplished by showing the existence of σ>0 and an allocation
(x(σ),y(σ)) with the property that for any σ ∈ [0,σ): (i) V1((x(σ),y(σ)),θ H,h 1;σ) is continuous
in σ, (ii) (x(σ),y(σ)) ∈ Ω(σ), and (iii) V1((x(0),y(0)),θ H,h 1;0)=V1(0).
We begin by constructing the allocation (x(σ),y(σ)). As a building block, we take an allocation
(x∗,y∗) which is optimal with risk neutrality (i.e., (x∗,y∗) ∈ Ψ(0)) and is such that the consump-
tion levels make UL and ICH(ht)( f o ra l lt and ht) hold with equality. Working backwards, we start
the construction with period T. For all σ and all hT choose (xT(hT+1;σ),y T(hT+1;σ)) such that:
(i) (xT(hT,θ L;σ),y T(hT,θ L;σ)) = (x∗
T(hT,θ L),y∗















Thus, (xT(hT+1;σ),y T(hT+1;σ)) is equal to (x∗
T(hT+1),y∗
T(hT+1)) except for the high type’s
consumption which is designed to maintain the incentive constraint ICH(hT) with equality.




36N o wg ot op e r i o dT −1. For all σ and all hT−1 choose (xT−1(hT;σ),y T−1(hT;σ)) such that: (i)
(xT−1(hT−1,θ L;σ),y T−1(hT−1,θ L;σ)) = (x∗
T−1(hT−1,θ L),y∗
T−1(hT−1,θ L)), (ii) yT−1(hT−1,θ H;σ)=
y∗









































That is, xT−1(hT−1,θ H;σ) is chosen to make the high type’s incentive constraint bind given the
other period T − 1 choices and what is going to happen in period T.
Keep going this way through period 2. Let R(σ) denote the expected present value of revenues








Similarly, let V (σ) denote the expected utility at the beginning of period 2 of an individual whose










) | θ1 = θL].
Finally, let S(σ) denote the expected gain in utility for an individual who was high ability in















θt ) | θ1 = θH].
For all σ choose (x1(h1,θ;σ),y 1(h1,θ;σ)) such that: (i) y1(h1,θ L;σ)=y∗
1(h1,θ L), and, (ii) the
triple y1(h1,θ H;σ), x1(h1,θ H;σ), and x1(h1,θ L;σ) satisfy the following three equalities:
µ(y1(h1,θ H;σ) − x1(h1,θ H;σ)) + (1 − µ)(y∗






















These equalities represent a system of three equations in the three unknowns y1(h1,θ H;σ),




1(h1,θ L)s a t i s ﬁes the above three equalities. Moreover, the Jacobian matrix associated with this
system at σ =0i s :
J =
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣






⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
The determinant of the Jacobian is





Thus, by the Implicit Function Theorem there exists some σ such that for all σ ∈ [0,σ]t h e r ee x i s t s
as o l u t i o n( y1(h1,θ H;σ),x 1(h1,θ H;σ),x 1(h1,θ L;σ)) which is continuous in σ.
T h u s ,w eh a v ec o n s t r u c t e df o ra l lσ ∈ [0,σ] an allocation (x(σ),y(σ)) that satisﬁes UL, R,
and ICH(ht) (for all t and ht) with equality and that is continuous in σ. In addition, using an
argument similar to that presented in Lemma 5, we can show that it satisﬁes ICL(ht)( f o ra l lt
and ht).
The next step is to demonstrate the existence of σε > 0 such that for any σ ∈ (0,σ ε)w eh a v e
that
V1(σ) ≤ V1(0) + ε.
Suppose to the contrary that there did not exist such a σε. Then for all n there would exist σn ∈
(0,1/n) such that V1(σn) >V 1(0)+ε.L e t( x(σn),y(σn)) denote the optimal allocation associated
with σn and consider the sequence h(x(σn),y(σn))i. Since the constraint set correspondence Ω(σ)
is upper hemi continuous by Fact A.1 and limn→∞ σn = 0, there exists a convergent subsequence
h(x(σk),y(σk))i whose limit point (b x,b y)i si nΩ(0). This implies that
V1((b x, b y),h 1,θ H;0)≤ V1(0).
But on the other hand the function V1((x,y),h 1,θ H;σ) is continuous in (x,y)a n dσ and hence
V1((b x,b y),h 1,θ H;0) = lim
k→∞
V1((x(σk),y(σk)),h 1,θ H;σk) ≥ V1(0) + ε.
38¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a7 :Let ε>0 be given and suppose that the claim does not hold. Then for all








|yt(ht+1,σ n) − y∗
t(ht+1)|] >ε .
for any earnings path y∗ that solves the problem described in Lemma 4. Consider the sequence
h(x(σn),y(σn))i. Since the constraint set correspondence Ω(σ) is upper hemi continuous and
limn→∞σn = 0 there exists a convergent subsequence h(x(σk),y(σk))i whose limit point (b x, b y)i s
in Ω(0). Moreover, since V1(σ) is continuous at σ = 0 by Lemma 6, we know that
lim
k→∞
V1((x(σk),y(σk)),h 1,θ H;σk)=V1((b x,b y),h 1,θ H;0)
= V1(0)
This implies that (b x,b y) ∈ Ψ(0) and by Lemma 5 we know that this implies that b y = y∗ for some


















|yt(ht+1,σ k) − y∗
t(ht+1)|] ≥ ε.
This is a contradiction. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Beginning with the ﬁrst part of the Proposition, we ﬁrst demonstrate
that for any ε>0t h e r ee x i s t sσε > 0s u c ht h a ti fσ<σ ε and (x,y) ∈ Ψ(σ), then, for any time
period t ≥ 2a n dh i s t o r yht 6=( θL,...,θL)





¶¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ <ε for θ ∈ {θL,θ H}.
Let ε>0 and suppose that the result does not hold. Then, for all n there exists some σn < 1/n,
an allocation (x(σn),y(σn)) ∈ Ψ(σn), a time period tn ≥ 2a n dah i s t o r yhtn 6=( θL,...,θL)s u c h




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≥ ε,
for some θ ∈ {θL,θ H}. We know from the fact that Ω(σ) is upper hemi continuous that there
exists a convergent sub-sequence of the sequence of allocations h(x(σn),y(σn))i whose limit point
belongs to Ω(0). Denote this convergent sub-sequence h(x(σk),y(σk))i and let its limit point be
39(b x,b y). Since V1(σ) is continuous at σ = 0, we know that (b x, b y) ∈ Ψ(0). It follows from Lemma 5





B u tw eh a v et h a tf o ra l lk








¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≥ ε.
Since limk→∞ xtk(htk,θ,σ k)σk = 1, this implies that there must exist ς>0s u c ht h a tf o rs u ﬃ-
ciently large k
|ytk(htk,θ,σ k) − b ytk(htk,θ))| ≥ ς.








|yt(ht+1,σ k) − b yt(ht+1)|] → 0.




















|yt(ht+1,σ k) − b yt(ht+1)|] ≥
1
T
[|ytk(htk,θ,σ k) − b ytk(htk,θ)|].








|yt(ht+1,σ k) − b yt(ht+1)|] ≥
1
T




This is a contradiction.
To complete the proof of the ﬁrst part of the Proposition, it only remains to show that for any
ε>0t h e r ee x i s t sσε > 0 such that if σ<σ ε and (x,y) ∈ Ψ(σ), then





¶¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ <ε .
T h i sc a nb ed o n eb yf o l l o w i n gt h ee x a c ts a m es t e p s .
For the second part of the Proposition, we need to show that, when T is suﬃciently large, for
any ε>0t h e r ee x i s t saσε > 0a n datε such that if σ ∈ (0,σ ε), then for any t ∈ {tε,...,T} and
history h∗
t =( θL,...,θL):







¶¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ <ε .
40Let ε>0. From Proposition 1, we know that for T suﬃciently large, for any ε0 > 0t h e r ee x i s t sa
tε0 such that if (x,y) ∈ Ψ(0), then, for time periods t ∈ {tεo,...,T} and history h∗
t =( θL,...,θL)
|y∗(θL) − yt (h∗
t,θ L)| <ε 0.
By Lemma 7, for any ε1 > 0a n da n yT there exists a σε1 > 0a n de a r n i n g sp a t hy∗ which
solves the problem described in Lemma 4 such that if σ ∈ (0,σ ε1)a n d( x,y) ∈ Ψ(σ) then for all
t ∈ {1,...,T}
|yt(h∗
t,θ L;σ) − y∗
t(h∗
t,θ L)| <ε 1.
Combining these implies that for T suﬃciently large, when σ ∈ (0,σ ε1)
|y∗(θL) − yt(h∗
t,θ L;σ)| <ε 0 + ε1
for t ∈ {tε0,...,T}.N o t i n gt h a tθL = ϕ0 (y∗(θL)) and choosing ε0 and ε1 appropriately yields the
result. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a8 :In the two-period model, an allocation can be fully described by
(x,y)={(xL,x H,x LL,x LH,x HL,x HH);(yL,y H,y LL,y LH,y HL,y HH)}.
Thus, (xL,y L) is the consumption-earnings bundle intended for those individuals who have low
ability in period one; (xLL,y LL) is the period two bundle intended for those who have low ability




















−ϕ(yLH/θH))] ≥ u (UL)
[µxH +( 1− µ)xL + G]+δ[µ(αHHxHH + αHLxHL)+( 1− µ)(αLHxLH + αLLxLL)+G]































































The Relaxed Problem eliminates the incentive constraints IC(L),IC(HL)a n dIC(LL). Let (x,y)
solve the Relaxed Problem. To prove the Lemma it suﬃces to show that there exists a σ>0s u c h
that if σ ∈ (0,σ) then the eliminated constraints are satisﬁed.
It is straightforward to show using similar arguments to those used in the proof of Lemma 5
that if an allocation (x,y)s a t i s ﬁes the constraints IC(H), IC(HH)a n dIC(LH) with equality
and if the earnings levels are such that yH ≥ yL, yHH ≥ yHL and yLH ≥ yLL, then the allocation
satisﬁes the constraints IC(L), IC(HL)a n dIC(LL). By a similar argument used in the proof of
Lemmata 6 and 7, we know that in the solution to the Relaxed Problem the earnings levels converge
to those that solve the problem in Lemma 4 and hence the earnings monotonicity conditions will
be satisﬁed for σ suﬃciently small. Thus, to prove the Lemma it suﬃces to show that if (x,y)
solves the Relaxed Problem, then for suﬃciently small σ, the constraints IC(H), IC(HL)a n d
IC(LL) bind.
Fact A.2: Let (x,y) solve the Relaxed Problem. Then, the constraints IC(HL) and IC(LL) bind.


































+ ϕ(yL/θH) − δ[αHH(
(xLH)1−σ
1 − σ


















+λR{µ[(yH − xH)+δ(αHH(yHH − xHH)+αHL(yHL − xHL))]
+(1 − µ)[(yL − xL)+δ(αLH(yLH − xLH)+αLL(yLL − xLL))]}.




























αLH λH + λLH/δαLH
. (19)
















































αLH λH + λLH/δαLH
. (23)
We ﬁrst show that λHH > 0. Suppose, to the contrary, that λHH = 0. Then it follows from the
ﬁrst order conditions for the high type’s consumptions that xHL = xHH. But from the conditions






which implies that yHL/θL <y HH/θH.B u t t h e n , s i n c e xHH = xHL, it is clear that IC(HH)
would be violated.
W en o ws h o wt h a tλLH > 0. Again, suppose to the contrary, that λLH = 0. Then it follows


























which implies that yLL/θL <y LH/θH. But then it is clear that IC(LH) would be violated. ¥
Now consider the Relaxed Utilitarian Problem given by
maxµ[
(xH)1−σ
1−σ − ϕ(yH/θH)] + δ[αHH(
(xHH)1−σ





1−σ − ϕ(yL/θL)] + δ[αLL(
(xLL)1−σ
1−σ − ϕ(yLL/θL)) + αLH(
(xLH)1−σ
1−σ − ϕ(yLH/θH))]
s.t. R, IC(H), IC(HH), & IC(LH).
Following the logic of Lemma 7, it is straightforward to show that as σ converges to 0, the earnings
levels that solve this problem converge to those that solve the Utilitarian Problem when σ =0 ;
namely, the surplus maximizing levels. In addition, we have that:
Fact A.3: Let (x,y) solve the Relaxed Utilitarian Problem. Then, for suﬃciently small σ, the
constraints IC(L),I C (HL) and IC(LL) bind.
Proof: Showing that IC(HL)a n dIC(LL) bind follows the proof of Fact A.2. Suppose then that
IC(L) does not bind. Then, we ﬁr s tn o t et h a ti tm u s tb et h a tf o ra n yε>0t h e r ei saσε such
44that if σ<σ ε then xHK −xLK <εfor K ∈ {H,L}. To see this assume by contradiction that for
any σ>0e i t h e rxHH −xLH ≥ ε,o rxHL−xLL ≥ ε. Then, for suﬃciently small σ it must be the
case that both xHH − xLH ≥ ε and xHL − xLL ≥ ε. This follows from the fact that the incentive








1−σ = ϕ(yLH/θH) − ϕ(yLL/θH)













1−σ which implies that xHH − xHL con-
verges to xLH − xLL.
Given this, consider a marginal decrease in xHH by ∆
µ(xHH)−σ, a decrease in xHL by ∆
µ(xHL)−σ,
and a marginal increase in xLH by ∆
(1−µ)(xLH)−σ,a n di nxLL by ∆
(1−µ)(xLL)−σ. This change
maintains the incentive constraints at time 2. For example, the incentive constraint after history









which is maintained for small ∆. In addition, this change keeps expected utility at time 1 constant.











































However, expected consumption at time 1 decreases. Expected consumption at time 1 as a function
of ∆ is




























We know that xHH >x LH and xHL >x LL and hence
C0(0) < −{(αHH − αLH)(
1
(xLH)




Moreover, since yLH >y LL for suﬃciently small σ,w eh a v et h a txLH >x LL and hence
C0(0) < −{
(αHH − αLH)+( αHL − αLL)
(xLL)
−σ } =0 .
This implies that the resources constraint can be relaxed without violating the other constraints:
a contradiction.






















If the incentive constraint IC(L) is not binding then we know that xH = xL and yH >y L.
Moreover, as σ converges to 0 we know that yHH converges to yLH and yHL converges to yLL.I n
addition, as we have argued, xHH converges to xLH and xHL converges to xLL. It follows that
the incentive constraint IC(L) must be violated - a contradiction. ¥
As noted above, if an allocation (x,y)s a t i s ﬁes the constraints IC(H),I C (HH)a n dIC(LH)
with equality and the earnings levels are monotonic, then it satisﬁes the constraints IC(L),
IC(HL)a n dIC(LL). We can therefore use Fact A.3 to deduce that there exists a σ>0
such that if σ ∈ (0,σ), (x,y) solves the Utilitarian Problem if and only if it solves the Relaxed
Utilitarian Problem.
Fact A.4: Let (x,y) solve the Relaxed Problem. Then, for suﬃciently small σ, the constraint
IC(L) binds.
Proof: Suppose that for suﬃciently small σ the constraint IC(L) in the Relaxed Problem does
not bind. Let (x∗,y∗) solve the Relaxed Problem. Then we know from the utility maintenance
constraint that
V1((x∗,y∗),h 1,θ L;σ) ≥ u
46In addition, since the incentive constraint is not binding, we have that






L/θH)+δE[V2((x∗,y∗),(h1,θ L),θ 2;σ)|θ1 = θH ].
Now let (xo,yo) solve the Relaxed Utilitarian Problem. Then we know by assumption that
V1((xo,yo),h 1,θ L;σ) < u. In addition, since all the incentive constraints are binding, we have
by Lemma 3
V1((xo,yo),h 1,θ H;σ)=V1((xo,yo),h 1,θ L;σ)+Φ(yo
L)+δ(αHH − αLH)Φ(yo
LL).
But, on the other hand, we know that since the second period incentive constraints are binding
in the Relaxed Problem and the ﬁrst period constraint is not binding, then we have:
V1((x∗,y∗),h 1,θ H;σ) ≥ V1((x∗,y∗),h 1,θ L;σ)+Φ(y∗
L)+δ(αHH − αLH)Φ(y∗
LL)
≥ u + Φ(y∗
L)+δ(αHH − αLH)Φ(y∗
LL).
But given that IC(L) is not binding the earnings levels converge to those that solve the Relaxed
Utilitarian Problem; namely, the surplus maximizing levels. This implies that
V1((x∗,y∗),h 1,θ H;σ) >V 1((xo,yo),h 1,θ H;σ).
Thus,
µV1((x∗,y∗),h 1,θ H;σ)+( 1− µ)V1((x∗,y∗),h 1,θ L;σ)
>µ V 1((xo,yo),h 1,θ H;σ)+( 1− µ)V1((xo,yo),h 1,θ L;σ),
which contradicts the fact that (xo,yo) solves the Relaxed Utilitarian Problem. ¥
The result now follows from Facts A.2 and A.4. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :It follows from the ﬁrst order conditions for the high types’ consump-
tions and earnings derived in the proof of the previous Lemma and the fact that λHH > 0t h a t
yH and yHH are set eﬃciently, while yHL is distorted downwards. It is also clear from the ﬁrst

























































αLL λH − λLH/δαLL



































αLL λH − λLH/δαLL







which yields the result since λU − αHL
αLL λH − λLH/δαLL > 0.
T h a tt h ed e g r e eo fd i s t o r t i o ni nt h ee a r n i n g so ft h o s ew h ob e c o m e sl o wt y p e si nt h es e c o n d
period converges to 0 as σ → 0 follows from Proposition 2. Thus, it only remains to show that


















λH = λR(1 − µ).
It will be shown in the next proposition that xL >x LL. This implies from the ﬁrst order conditions


























































and the result follows by the convexity of ϕ. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :For the ﬁrst statement we need to show that xH ∈ (xHL,x HH)a n d
xL ∈ (xLL,x LH). The ﬁrst claim follows immediately from the ﬁrst order conditions for the high
types’ consumption (see the proof of Fact A.2) and the fact that (as shown in the proof of Fact A.2)
λHH is positive. For the second claim, note ﬁrst that since (as shown in the proof of Proposition 3)
yLL ≤ yLH the incentive constraint IC(LH) implies that xLL <x LH.T h u s ,i fxL / ∈ (xLL,x LH),
then either it is the case that xL ≤ xLL <x LH or it is the case that xLL <x LH ≤ xL.






αLL λH − λLH/δαLL
.
This implies that [αLL − αHL]λHδ ≥ λLH. But this means that
αHH
αLH
λH − λLH/δαLH ≥
αHH
αLH









From the ﬁrst order conditions for xL and xLH this implies that (xLH)−σ ≥ (xL)−σ which means
that xLH ≤ xL - a contradiction.






αLH λH − λLH/δαLH)
.
49This implies that λLH ≤ δ(αHH − αLH)λH.B u tt h i sm e a n st h a t
αHL
αLL
λH + λLH/δαLL ≤
αHL
αLL









From the ﬁrst order conditions for xL and xLL this implies that (xLL)−σ ≤ (xL)−σ which means
that xLL ≥ xL - a contradiction.
For the second statement, we need to show that for K ∈ {L,H}
(xK)−σ <α KH(xKH)−σ + αKL(xKL)−σ.
Deﬁne υ(x)=( x)1−σ/(1 − σ)a n dυ(xi)=vi for i = K,KL,KH. Consider a decrease in υK by
φ (which can be positive or negative) and a contextual increase of υKL and υKH by
φ
δ.A f t e r t h i s
change the utility maintenance constraint and the incentive compatibility constraints at t =1a n d
2 are obviously satisﬁed, since utilities at t = 2 change by the same amounts and the net present
value of the expected utility of reporting K at t = 1 is unchanged. It must be that this change







































which implies (xK)−σ <α KH(xKH)−σ + αLL(xKL)−σ. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a9 :Consider a particular period t ≥ 2a n ds o m eh i s t o r yht. We are interested
in knowing when (x∗
ht,y∗
ht) will be a solution to Problem PI
ht. This is clearly the case if ht 6=
h∗
t = {θL,...θL} since Proposition 2 tells us that (x∗
ht,y∗
ht)i sﬁr s tb e s te ﬃcient. Therefore we focus
attention on the history h∗
t.
Observe that the program PI
h∗
t is identical to the Second Best Problem, but for two exceptions.
On the one hand, the reservation value of those with history h∗
t who are low types at time t is their
expected continuation value Vt ((x∗,y∗),h ∗
t,θ L;0) instead of u. On the other hand, the revenue
requirement is not G/(1 − δ), but the expected revenue generated from individuals with history
50h∗
t by (x∗,y∗). We will exploit this similarity to solve the program PI
h∗
t i nt h es a m ew a ya sw e
did the Second Best Problem. However, a certain amount of work is necessary to show that the
equivalent of Lemma 1 holds for the Relaxed Problem corresponding to PI
h∗
t.
















≥ Vt ((x∗,y∗),h ∗
t,θ L;0)
and ICH(ht+j)&ICL(ht+j) ∀ ht+j º h∗
t ∀ j =0 ,1,..
Thus, we maximize the expected present value of revenues that can be extracted from individuals
with history h∗
t at time t subject to the constraint that those with low ability at time t have at








t)d e n o t et h e
solution to the revenue maximizing problem. We can immediately apply Lemmata 1-5 to this
problem and conclude that the earnings path yR
h∗







δjE[yt+j(ht+j,θ t+j) − ϕ(yt+j(ht+j,θ t+j)/θt+j)|h∗
t ]










+ Vt ((x∗,y∗),h ∗
t,θ L;0)]
We can now establish:
Fact A.5: If (9) holds, then for any h∗
t+j, y∗
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L) >y R
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L).
Proof: Since Pr(θt = θH |h∗
t )=αLH, for any history h∗
t+j, yR
t+j(h∗





















Under our assumption that ϕ000 ≥ 0 the revenues are a strictly concave function of each yt+j,
implying that revenues are decreasing in yt+j(h∗
t+j,θ L)o nt h ei n t e r v a l[ yR
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L),∞). From











¸1−t γ (1 − δ)(1− µ)
























¸1−t γ (1 − δ)(1− µ)






¸−1 γ (1 − δ)(1− µ)




So the right hand side of (26) is larger than the right hand side of (25), and concavity of the
revenue function implies that y∗
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L) >y R
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L). ¥




Fact A.6: Let (xh∗
t,y h∗
t) solve the Relaxed Problem corresponding to PI
h∗
t in which the incentive
compatibility constraints for the low types are ignored. Then ICH(h∗
t) holds with equality.
Proof: Assume, by contradiction, that ICH(h∗
t) is not binding. Following the same argument as
in Lemma 1, it follows that (xh∗
t,yh∗
t)m u s tb ee ﬃcient starting from h∗
t. Therefore, using Lemma
7 and Proposition 2
yt+j(h∗
t+j,θ L) >y ∗
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L) >y R
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L)








Since revenues are strictly decreasing on the interval [yR
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L),∞), it follows that the tax
revenues generated by (xh∗
t,yh∗
t) must be strictly lower than the revenues generated by the ex
ante optimal solution (x∗
ht,y∗
ht) starting from h∗
t: but this is a contradiction because then the
revenues constraint would be violated. ¥




t) will be a solution to
PI
h∗
t if and only if y∗
h∗
t is a solution to the problem
maxyht
PT−t






+ Vt ((x∗,y∗),h ∗
t,θ L;0)
s.t. R∗ (h∗
t)(1− δ) ≤ (1 − δ)
PT−t






Pr(θt = θH |h∗
t )
PT−t













52Accordingly, to prove the result we need to show that y∗
h∗
t is a solution to the problem if and only
if (9) holds.
Since Pr(θt = θH |h∗














[γS (1 − δ)]
(1 − γSαLH(1 − δ))
T−t X
j=0
δjE[yt+j(ht+j,θ t+j) − ϕ(yt+j(ht+j,θ t+j)/θt+j)|h∗
t ]
w h e r ew eh a v ed i v i d e dt h r o u g hb y1 −γSαLH(1−δ) and omitted the constants Vt ((x∗,y∗),h ∗
t,θ L;0)
and R∗ (h∗
t). We denote the Lagrange multiplier γS to distinguish it from the analogous multiplier
γ for the program solved by y∗.L e tyS
h∗
t denote the solution to this program. Under our assumption
that ϕ000 ≥ 0 the Lagrangian is a strictly concave function of each yt+j and the solution is unique.
We can now prove the Lemma:
Suﬃcient condition: If (9) is satisﬁed, then y∗
h∗
t is a solution to problem PS
h∗
t. We proceed in
three steps.
Step 1. We ﬁrst show that
γS (1 − δ)αLL






¸1−t γ (1 − δ)(1− µ)
γµ(1 − δ) − 1
(27)






satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition:
γS (1 − δ)αLL


















if ht+j 6= h∗
t+j; and it would be fully eﬃcient otherwise. If (27) is not true, then after any history
h∗
t+j, concavity of the Lagrangian implies that the solution yS
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L) of (28) is strictly larger
t h a nt h ee xa n t eo p t i m a ls o l u t i o ny∗
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L). Moreover, from Fact A.5 we know that that the ex
ante optimal solution y∗
t+j(h∗






t+j,θ L) >y ∗
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L) >y R
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L).
Since tax revenues are strictly decreasing on the interval [yR
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L),∞), this would imply
that the revenues corresponding to the earnings path yS
h∗
t are strictly lower than under the ex ante
optimal solution y∗
h∗
t: it follows that the revenue constraint (PS
h∗
t)i sn o ts a t i s ﬁed - a contradiction.
53Step 2. Next we show that:
γS (1 − δ)αLL






¸1−t γ (1 − δ)(1− µ)
γµ(1 − δ) − 1
(29)





t and the consumption levels xS
h∗
t are such as to make ICH(ht+j) for all j and
ht+j º h∗






t)m u s t
solve problem PI
h∗
t. But if (29) is not true, then after any history h∗
t+j the solution yS
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L)
of (28) is smaller and hence more distorted than the ex ante optimal solution y∗
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L). Since




t, we would have that








t). But this is a contradiction since
in this case it is impossible that all the constraints of program PI
h∗
t are satisﬁed and its value is
strictly larger than Vt ((x∗,y∗),h ∗
t,θ H;0).
Step 3. From Steps 1 and 2 it follows that
γS (1 − δ)αLL






¸1−t γ (1 − δ)(1− µ)
γµ(1 − δ) − 1
.





Necessary condition: If (9) is not satisﬁed, then y∗
h∗
t is not a solution to problem PS
h∗
t.




smaller than the revenue maximizing solution yR
t+j(h∗
t+j,θ L). Let yh∗
t be an earnings path such that
for any history h∗
t+j, yt+j(h∗




t+j,θ L),y∗(θL)}) but otherwise
equals y∗
h∗
t. Then this earnings path raises strictly more revenue and yields a strictly higher level of




t is not a solution to problem PS
h∗
t. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 : Let Ω = G +( 1− δ)u. Then, if (x∗,y∗) is a second best eﬃcient











s.t. Ω ≤ (1 − δ)
T X
t=1











54Let γ(Ω) denote the associated Lagrange multiplier. Condition (9) of Lemma 9 implies that, when
αLH
αHH ∈ (0,µ), there is a threshold γ> 1
µ(1−δ) such that (x∗,y∗) is time consistent if and only if
γ(Ω) ≤ γ.L e tΩ b et h em a x i m u mv a l u eo fΩ such that the above problem has a solution. Let Ω
be the largest value of Ω such that there exists an eﬃcient allocation in which those who are low
types in period one have expected utility u and none of the high types’ incentive constraints are















¸1−t (1 − µ)
1 − 1
γ(1−δ)
which is decreasing in γ. We know from our characterization of y∗(Ω)t h a t ,f o ra n yt:
Λ1 (y∗
t(θL;h∗
t;Ω)) = Λ2 (t,γ(Ω)).
F o ra l lo t h e rh i s t o r i e s ,y∗
t(θL;ht;Ω)i se ﬃcient.





δt−1E[yt(ht,θ t) − xt(ht,θ t)]
s.t. V1((x,y),h 1,θ L;0)≥ u
and ICH(ht)&ICL(ht) for all t & ht.
Let (xR,yR) denote the solution to this problem. As in the proof of Lemma 9, we can immediately
apply Lemmata 1-5 to this problem and conclude that the revenue maximizing earnings path
earnings path yR solves the problem:
max
y (1 − δ)
T X
t=1





















55while for all other histories yR
t (ht,θ L)i se ﬃcient. Note also that yR is completely independent of
Ω.
Now consider two values of Ω, e Ω,Ω0 ∈ (Ω,Ω) such that e Ω > Ω0.W ec l a i mt h a tγ(e Ω) >γ (Ω0).





t,θ L) − y∗
t(h∗
t,θ L; e Ω)














1 Λ2 (t,γ(Ω0)) − Λ
−1









so that the diﬀerence between the revenue maximizing income level yR
t (h∗
t,θ L)a n dt h ec o n -
strained eﬃcient income y∗
t(h∗
t,θ L; e Ω) is not smaller than the diﬀerence between yR
t (h∗
t,θ L)a n d
y∗
t(h∗
t,θ L;Ω0). Since these diﬀerences must have the same sign and since revenues are concave in
yt, it follows that y∗(e Ω) cannot generate more revenues than y∗(Ω0). This is a contradiction since
e Ω > Ω0.
To see that as Ω → Ω, γ(Ω) → 1
µ(1−δ) note that as Ω → Ω the incentive compatibility
constraints for the high types become non-binding, so taxation becomes eﬃcient. This implies
that γ(Ω) → 1
µ(1−δ). Similarly as Ω converges to Ω, γ(Ω)m u s tc o n v e r g et oi n ﬁnity, otherwise
some resources would be left to the high type and tax revenues would not be maximized. Q.E.D.
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